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Information Systems today rarely are contained within a single user workstation, server, or
networked environment. Data can be transparently accessed from any location, and maintained
across various network infrastructures. Cloud computing paradigms commoditize the hardware
and software environments and allow an enterprise to lease computing resources by the hour,
minute, or number of instances required to complete a processing task. An access control policy
mediates access requests between authorized users of an information system and the system’s
resources. Access control policies are defined at any given level of abstraction, such as the file,
directory, system, or network, and can be instantiated in layers of increasing (or decreasing)
abstraction. For the system end-user, the functional allocation of security policy to discrete
system components, or subsystems, may be too complex for comprehension. In this dissertation,
the concept of a metapolicy, or policy that governs execution of subordinate security policies, is
introduced. From the user’s perspective, the metapolicy provides the rules for system
governance that are functionally applied across the system’s components for policy enforcement.
The metapolicy provides a method to communicate updated higher-level policy information to
all components of a system; it minimizes the overhead associated with access control decisions
by making access decisions at the highest level possible in the policy hierarchy. Formal
definitions of policy often involve mathematical proof, formal logic, or set theoretic notation.
Such policy definitions may be beyond the capability of a system user who simply wants to
control information sharing. For thousands of years, mankind has used narrative and
storytelling as a way to convey knowledge. This dissertation discusses how the concepts of
storytelling can be embodied in computational narrative and used as a top-level requirements
specification. The definition of metapolicy is further discussed, as is the relationship between
the metapolicy and various access control mechanisms. The use of storytelling to derive the
metapolicy and its applicability to formal requirements definition is discussed. The author’s
hypothesis on the use of narrative to explain security policy to the system user is validated
through the use of a series of survey instruments. The survey instrument applies either a
traditional requirements specification language or a brief narrative to describe a security policy
and asks the subject to interpret the statements. The results of this research are promising and
reflect a synthesis of the disciplines of neuroscience, security, and formal methods to present a
potentially more comprehensible knowledge representation of security policy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Oxford English Dictionary defines security (OED, 2012) as:
•
•
•
•

the state of being free from danger or threat: the system is designed
to provide maximum security against toxic spills; job
security
the safety of a state or organization against criminal activity such as
terrorism, theft, or espionage: a matter of national security
procedures followed or measures taken to ensure the safety of a
state or organization: amid tight security the presidents met in
the Colombian resort
the state of feeling safe, stable, and free from fear or anxiety: this
man could give the emotional security she needed

and further defines cybersecurity (OED, 2012) as:
[as noun]:
the state of being protected against the criminal or unauthorized use of electronic
data, or the measures taken to achieve this:
some people have argued that the threat to cybersecurity has been somewhat
inflated
[as modifier]:
IT security professionals said that outsourcing would be the biggest
cybersecurity threat
From these definitions, it becomes evident that a sense of security requires more than just
a single person: it requires a person with something that needs security, such as data, and
a second person who desires to take that sense of security away from an individual by
stealing the information or otherwise exploiting a vulnerability.

In Medieval Times,

serfs gained a sense of security by working for lords and living within the walls of their
castles. And so it is today, as we seek a sense of security for our data with protective
1

countermeasures such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and virtual private
networks.
Whether we wish to admit it or not, security is a social function (Schaefer, 2009):
It is about a person, organization, or entity determining which information to share.
Schaefer further states:
Security, at its most basic, requires the ability to differentiate, to
recognize one object is different from another. We differentiate objects
for the many reasons we assign attributes and values. For survival, for
example, we place a skull and crossbones on a bottle of poison. How do
we differentiate? One assigns an attribute to an observation as a label
with meaning. The label is something reliably, repeatedly measurable,
using our five senses, perhaps using tools or technology as extensions of
our senses. Differentiation may be made by scientific observation and
objectivity, or by just because, reasoning overridden by subjective feeling
(Schaefer, 2009, p. 2) (emphasis from original text).
Schell states that labels can be used as a social mechanism for
understanding the sensitivity of the user’s current context; be it processing the
reading or the writing of information. That is, labels provide the user an external
cue as to the sensitivity of the information when it is addressed in the
environmental context of who, what, when, where, why, and how (Schell, 2001).
In this context, a security policy addresses the protection mechanisms
employed to protect an organization’s assets from potential misuse. In reality, a
security policy is a set of clearly articulated rules that specify constraints about
data usage (Bell D. E., 2005). The access control policy defines how system users
interact with the data stored within the system.
This dissertation explores the use of structured storytelling paradigms to
extract the security policy for the system consumer. We begin with a background
2

discussion of security policy and traditional formalism used for policy expression.
From this foundation, we move to a discussion of secure system design
techniques based in formalism, and explore the usability constraints associated
with formal methods. We present an alternative policy definition strategy: that
of storytelling, and describe an experiment to determine the usability of this
approach. Finally, we present the results of the experiment; discuss its
implications, and potential areas for further research in this area.
Historical Background
Winsborough poses the question of whether policy can be distinguished from
requirements and states that policy is intentional, in that it provides rules characterizing
the author’s intentions for system behavior; whereas requirements are not concerned
about the underlying intentions (Winsborough, 2004). Winsborough further states that a
policy is a set of rules that are used to manage and control the state and state transitions
of one or more managed objects (p.20) An individual policy rule is considered an
intelligent data container; containing:
•
•
•
•

knowledge and metadata that define the semantics and behavior of the
policy rule and its effect on the rest of the system.
A group of events that can be used to trigger the evaluation of the condition
clause of a policy rule.
A group of conditions aggregated by the policy rule.
A group of actions aggregated by the policy rule (p. 20)

Beyond these statements, Winsborough speculates on the feasibility of a single policy
language, responsible for translating policies into plans of action, composing policies,
and interpreting policies amongst domains. Further, such a language would have to
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address conflict detection and resolution, dependency analysis, and allow translation into
multiple graphical user interfaces to address the needs of various constituencies (p. 42).
He concludes with a wish list for policy specification, namely that policy creation
techniques should be (i) sufficiently expressive of preferences regarding cost v.
performance, security, risk, and reliability; (ii) sufficiently structured and/or naturally
suited to human psychology and cognition to keep specification errors to an absolute
minimum; and (iii) robust to specification errors (p. 43).
Current generation computer systems are rarely monolithic architectures. Rather,
there are user clients, connected to various servers through the Internet, traversing
routers, switches, and firewalls to fulfill information requests. In this environment,
every security policy becomes a meta-policy, and the individual policy rules can be
decomposed based on their function, forming subordinate policies to address specific
concerns, for example: accountability, authentication, contingency, or access control.
Figure 1 illustrates a representative policy model for an enterprise application (Sherwood,
Clark, & Lynas, 2008).
With such a large number of subordinate policies composing a security metapolicy, authoring a policy becomes an exercise in formal specification to ensure policy
correctness. However, the higher the degree of formalism desired, the higher the degree
of expertise required to generate a policy. As an example, consider the following:
Jajodia developed the Authorization Specification Language (ASL) to specify
various access control policies with stratified clause form logic (Jajodia, 1997). The
following are two example rules in ASL:
4

cando (file 1, Customer, +read) <- {members of the role customer can read file1}
cando (file 2, s, +write) <- in (s, Employee) & -^OM (s, Customer)
{subjects active in the role “Employee” and Not the role “Customer” may write to file 2}

Figure 1 – The many layers of security policy (Sherwood, Clark, & Lynas, 2008).
An alternate language specification is proposed in LaSCO (Hoagland J.A., 1998),
where the following graphical structure is used to indicate that a Customer needs to have
an ID represented by the policy variable $UID included in the access control list of file 1
in order to have access to it:

5

In most access control models, access control is defined as a triple consisting of
the <subject, object, privileges> associated with a given data container, for example, a
file or a row in a database. In the early days of computing, much discussion surrounded
how access control models should be represented in computer systems. (Schell, 1979)
developed the notion of multilevel mode of operations, stating:
In multilevel mode, the computer must internally distinguish multiple levels of
information sensitivity and user authorization. Internal Controls of hardware
and programs must assure that each user has access to only authorized
information (p. 20).
Schell further stated:
The security kernel design is derived directly from a precise specification (i.e.
mathematical model) of its functions (like a cryptographic algorithm). This
mathematical model is a precise formulation of access rules based on user
attributes (clearance, need-to-know) and information attributes
(classification). (p. 21).
By 2001, Schell had a slightly different perspective, stating that users want the
convenience of being in the same virtual integrity domain as the least mindful and least
informed among them (Schell, 2001). He further stated that to counter malicious
software, systems must be designed and built to have all of the following properties:
•
•
•

No exploitable flaws.
Enforce security policies on information flow, thereby bounding the damage of
malicious applications software.
Built to be subject to third party inspection and analysis to confirm the protections
are correct, complete, and do nothing more than advertised.

To summarize, the security model must be a valid representation of the behavior with
regard to the information protection of the entire system. The model must include a
proven security theorem, which establishes that the model’s behavior always complies
with the security requirements for the policy of interest rather than being a formalization
6

of the mechanism itself. To illustrate, Schell defined three domains for execution, as
illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Domains for execution reflecting mandatory, discretionary, and application
layer security policies.
Unfortunately, separate domains do not reflect the security policies of most civil
government and commercial organizations.

The U.S. Government has a uniform

classification hierarchy for information, (Top Secret, Secret, Confidential, and
Unclassified) which can be represented as a mathematical lattice structure. Commercial
organizations usually do not maintain a similar uniform classification hierarchy that is
recognized and enforced by other organizations, but instead implement access controls
based upon a user’s role in the organization. For example: a user may have a functional
role (system administrator), an organizational role (manger, IT department), and an
7

administrative role (time card approver). The concept of Role-based access control
(RBAC) was introduced by (Ferraiolo, 1995; Schell, 1979), and (Sandhu R. C., 1996) to
more accurately model the workings of a commercial enterprise. In RBAC, access
control is based on a four-element set (user, group, object, privileges). A user may
belong to many groups, each with a different privilege set. In the worst-case model,
every user has their own group, and there are as many groups to administer as there are
users. In (Ferraiolo, 1995) a role is defined and centrally administered within an
organization. RBAC as a modeling tool has been accepted as a useful tool that reflects
both how organizations function and how information access is implemented in most
commercial applications.
However, with the flexibility of RBAC, there are some limitations. In a
distributed network centric enterprise, it may take several hours to confirm the update of
an application’s access control roles.

Because several applications may use their own

security services instead of the centralized security services of the operating system, it
may be difficult to determine whether an access control policy has been completely
administered. In fact, it may well be that RBAC in a distributed enterprise can violate the
three primary engineering principals of a security reference monitor validation
mechanism (Schell, 1979, p. 29):
1. Completeness – that the policy is invoked on every access to data
2. Isolation – the security mechanism is protected from unauthorized
modification
3. Verifiability – the policy must be small and simple for complete test and
verification.
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There are times when an event may occur that requires comprehensive preemption or revocation of a security policy. For example, after September 11, 2001, data
security policies for U.S. Government web sites were changed (U.S. Government, 2003).
In these instances, waiting for confirmation that the access control policy has been
updated throughout the enterprise may not be possible. (Hosmer, 1991) presented the
notion of a metapolicy to address instances of arbitration among diverse domains
implementing disparate security policies. In her paper, the use of a metapolicy to address
immediate access control policy changes for an enterprise is presented. The paper
discussed how a metapolicy approach differs from the current work on context and
constraint based access control policies. It then discussed the problems associated with
metapolicy creation and administration, including how multiple policies may coexist
within a domain. The use of narrative storytelling, and computer-assisted storytelling is
presented as an alternative method of meta-policy formation. This technique is examined
in the context of Risk-Adaptive Access Control (RAdAC), the current state of thought for
globally distributed security policies.
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. The problem of timely
policy administration is presented. Next, the barriers and issues associated with the
coexistence of multiple policies in a single domain are addressed. A survey of the
literature addressing the technologies of system design, policy, requirements engineering,
and computer assisted storytelling is presented. A metapolicy creation methodology is
proposed as an experiment and the experimental results are presented. Finally, future
work on the use of meta-policies for access control is addressed.
9

PROBLEM STATEMENT
In the current generation of information systems, security policy enforcement
mechanisms are dispersed throughout the system architecture as countermeasures to
specific threats (Henning, 2002). For example, virus scanning, firewalls, virtual private
networking (VPN) clients, and intrusion prevention sensors were all created to respond to
specific threats to information systems. Figure 3 illustrates this functional architecture.
In essence, every time a vulnerability is identified, publicized, and exploited, another
stopgap security countermeasure is created in response to the threat.

CORPORATE
NETWORK

Centralized Security
Monitoring

Local Node

DNS/
Web
Servers

Firewalls

IDS

TRADING
PARTNERS

INTERNET

Security
Router

Routers

LAN

BACKDOOR
CONNECTIONS

ID &
Authentication
Servers

Dial-up
modems

Figure 3. Functional security architecture, with countermeasures deployed against
specific threats.
The problem with this approach to security is that it is highly reactive, in that
system protections are deployed in response to specific threat information. Ideally,
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general-purpose security mechanisms such as access control lists exist so that adaptive
security policies can be defined and deployed in response to a specific threat. For
example, an intrusion prevention sensor can be provided an attack signature that allows it
to identify a new type of vulnerability and neutralize it.
In addition to being reactive to threats, this type of security policy is not
particularly useful in an enterprise environment. Within the context of an enterprise,
security policies are generally high-level, technology neutral, concern risks, set directions
and procedures, and define penalties and countermeasures if the policy is transgressed
(Rees, 2003). Unfortunately, those grand enterprise access control policies do not
translate into implementable mechanisms. Figure 4 illustrates the breakdown between
implementation capabilities and user access control policy specification.

User Rule:
Only allow access to these
Data elements when the
User is on company property

Logical Representation
A user U, may access an object O, IFF User_Location = in office

Formal Policy Model Representation
A user U, may access an object O, IFF User_Location = in office is True

Decomposes to these device policies for implementation

Firewall
• Permit protocols
• Prevent protocols

VPN
Accelerator
• Encrypt traffic
• Use this algorithm
• Key expiration date

Database
• Allow this user,
these views, for this
purpose

Server
•Accept connection
on a given port
•Allow access to
•Directory or file

Router
• Permit IP address to
Connect to IP address

Figure 4 – Decomposition of policy model representations demonstrates the disconnect
between implementation and formalism in enterprise models.
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The issue, then, is how to specify a security policy at a high level that has
significance to the policy users, and can be traced to lower level implementation guidance
and functional system decomposition activities.

Figure 5 illustrates the concept of a

security policy specification that accommodates traditional non-ambiguous security
policy information (user X can only see SECRET Data), contextual information (user X
can only see SECRET data if in the office) and usage constraints (User X cannot send
information outside a given domain), as well as more abstract notions such as “share no
information outside the organization.” In the ideal world, a security policy can be
defined as a series of binary grant/deny operations.

In reality, grant/deny operations are

contingent upon environmental, organizational, and operational constraints, which may
be defined with varying degrees of specificity. In the extreme case, security policy could
be defined as “if a user says share the data, then share the data.” However, it becomes
much more difficult to embed this type of constraint within a computer system. An
analogous situation would be to “know art when you see it.”
In the ideal case, a security policy can be decomposed to address various contexts,
or environments, for its enforcement. Security policies define acceptable and
unacceptable behavior for software systems (Schneider, 2000). For example, a user in a
remote office may not have the same access rights to information as a user at corporate
headquarters. Specification of contextual security information facilitates creation of a
useful access control policy.
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Highly Unspecified Work
If X, and T, and
U, and V, and
In office, then Y

Providing Context
Monitoring Constraints

If X, and T, and
U, and V, then Y

Planning Options Based
on Constraints

Degrees of
Specificity

Guiding Through Scripts/
directions
If X, then Y

Highly Specified Work

Figure 5 - Degrees of specificity that can be applied to security policy.
(Burnside & Keromytis, 2007) discuss the concept of enterprise security
management with global security policies. Every policy decision is made with nearglobal knowledge, and then re-evaluated as the global knowledge changes. Four major
types of components are applied:
1. Sensors. Small programs scattered around the network that generate events
corresponding to observed network and application behavior.
2. Events. Any action performed by an application that may be relevant to some
policy decision. Events may be positive or negative.
3. Policy. A list of objectives, rules for behavior, requirements and responses,
whose goal is to ensure the security of the network.
4. Actuators.
A program, which modifies application behavior after being
triggered by a policy; the policy enforcement point.
A network, consisting of applications and network links, is observed by the
sensors, each generating events in response to requests. Events are evaluated by policy,
which makes decisions and notifies the actuators to modify application behavior in
response.
13

DISSERTATION GOAL
The goal of this dissertation `is to determine the feasibility of defining a top-level
security policy supporting a significant degree of formalism that can accommodate
verification of completeness and traceability to lower-level functional system
specifications. The objective is to define the set of logical security principles that govern
system behavior, are enforceable throughout the system design process, and are
comprehensible to the system stakeholders. The scope of this research is the solicitation
of these logical security principles in a rigorous and standardized methodology such that
formalism can be subsequently applied to the policy model. The system environment
may not be well defined during early implementation phases or in usage scenarios,
which, in turn, inhibits the development of effective foundation security measures. If the
foundation security mechanisms are not in place early, it may not be practical to apply
them during later phases without extensive system rework. An end-user should never
have to be concerned with the format of an access control list or firewall rule: a general
statement of access management should be traceable to lower-level implementation
specific constraints. These general statements, or metapolicy, provide the overarching
governance framework for an information system.

RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS
Kendall Haven, in Story Proof (Haven, 2007) states:
Mankind has learned to read and write only in the past few hundred years.
Logical, expository, and argumentative forms first emerged perhaps 5,000
years ago. But humans have been telling stories for 100,000 years or
more.
Evolutionary biologists tell us that 100,000 years of story
14

dominance in human interaction has rewired the human brain to be
predisposed before birth to think in, make sense in, and create meaning
from stories (p.24).
Boyd (Boyd, 2009) states “humans are hyper-intelligent and hyper-social animals.
By integrating intelligence, cooperation, pattern-seeking, alliance making, and beliefs and
knowledge from other people, stories make us stronger and more effective.”
Haven further states:
By the beginning of kindergarten, the concepts of story “trouble”
character, temporal sequencing, cause-and-effect sequencing, and goal are
well fixed and known. Given a character and a goal, children will easily
identify the type of trouble that is most likely to occur and will correctly
identify that trouble will emerge to block a character from reaching the
stated goal. Additionally, they know to search for hints of upcoming
trouble. They know what to expect from a story and will adjust their
perceptions and their interpretations of narrative inputs to find (or create)
it (p. 25).
To extend further and summarize cognitive science: humans require that events
make sense, and create or mentally invent what is needed to make sense through causeand-effect sequencing, temporal sequencing, centering around a common theme, and
character analysis.

Bransford and Brown stated, “the mind imposes structure on the

information available from experience and interprets (creates meaning for) experience
through this story structure” (Bransford, 2000).
The research question posed is simple: if the human brain is most receptive to the
narrative, story-like structure, why not apply it to the concept of security policy? Current
device implementation languages such as Cisco’s Internet Operating System (IOS),
Linux, or Windows OS demand specific programming language syntax. This syntactic
level of complexity is multiplied in a heterogeneous infrastructure of network
15

components, servers, clients, and applications.

Expecting a system developer to

understand and implement policy consistently within a complex architecture may be
beyond a programmer’s level of understanding and result in error-ridden implementations
that are exploitable by malicious users.
Our hypothesis is that the security policy elements required to implement
complex security meta-policies can be best expressed as story or narrative elements.
Through the use of narrative story, security policy can be expressed in the format most
familiar to mankind, and most commonly used to represent socially acceptable normative
behavior. In turn, these narrative elements can be decomposed into sub-policies and
system requirements such that the policy enforcement mechanisms can be explicitly
traced back to the specific story elements in the top-level policy statement.

What we

seek to provide is the linkage from the computational language used to create machine
instructions to the comprehensible language used to express policy rules in everyday life.
For example, a parent tells a child to play in the yard, not the street.

A parent

does not express that as a logical axiom, but the intent is to enforce a boundary on the
area acceptable for play. The child comes to understand that boundary through repeated
statement of the rule, and possibly punishment for disobedience. The parent intends to
provide a safe play area for the child, namely, the yard.
implicit in the rule, and is not logically expressed.

The safety of the play area is

In a computational language, the

domain of the yard would be defined, and an executable statement would be tested to
determine if it was within the domain or beyond the domain’s boundaries.

16

RELEVANCE AND SIGNIFICANCE
This section discusses the various research conducted on access control models
that is relevant to the concept of metapolicy formulation and implementation.
In (Hosmer, 1991) the concept of a metapolicy was introduced. A metapolicy is a
policy about other policies, the rules and assumptions about the policies, and explicitly
states the coordination of interaction among policies rather than implicitly leaving such
coordination to the administrators. (p. 2). Hosmer’s interpretation was that a metapolicy
would address how diverse policies could interact across domain boundaries, how data
could be updated across domains, and how precedence could be determined and
ambiguity removed.
Provisions were made for concurrent support of multiple policies to meet multiple
security goals or the needs of different organizations with their own policy intentions; the
provision was made for multiple policies. The constraints on support for multiple
metapolicies were that each metapolicy had its own:
•
•
•

Source or owner,
Enforcement authorities, which could be different from the source, and
Evolutionary timeframe (Hosmer, 1991, pp. 4-5).

Initially, metapolicies were envisioned as being flexible, potentially layered,
tamperproof, and providing a controlling representation of the organization, system, or
security policy they represented. In (Hosmer, 1993), the concept of a multipolicy
paradigm was presented. A key use of multipolicies was for changing circumstances, for
example when a country moves from peace to war. (p. 1). The emphasis was on explicit
statements of interaction that could continuously enforce the multipolicy intersection and
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be formally specifiable and subject to verification of tamper-resistance, the very
characteristics Schell presented as desirable for a security kernel architecture.
Bell, and LaPadula, (1976) modeled a multilevel security policy that was
implemented in the Multics operating system. This model essentially partitioned the
operating system into N-levels of processing, where processing between levels was
governed by the Multics security policy. In (Bell D. , 1994) modeling an instance of a
“Multipolicy Machine” is presented and 4 levels of abstraction are associated with any
given security policy (p. 2):
1. An organization abstraction, written as a narrative, for people to read;
2. A conceptual abstraction, discussing an organizational policy at the concept level;
3. An abstract level, describing the design and tracing the conceptual requirements;
and
4. An implementation level, describing the design as developed.
Bell further uses requests, decisions, and state-transition decisions to describe the
computational machine model of a multi-policy system component.
(Baskerville, 2002) and (Hafmann & Kuhnhauser, 1999) addressed the concept
of an information security meta-policy for an organization, and the characteristics of such
a meta-policy. Security is considered a facilitating capability, not a hindrance, and there
is recognition that access control policies change over time. Meta-policies, in this
discussion, must possess the characteristic of political simplicity, and be criterionoriented: that is, they must be comprehensible and produce a measurable result. (p. 341).
In essence, these meta-policies require explicit statements enumerating the subject’s
accessing data objects, and the rules for access that will be enforced.

18

(Hafmann & Kuhnhauser, 1999) demonstrated that the multi-policy concept could
be implemented in a Distributed Computing Environment (DCE) in software, with a
collection of small software security components that were used to enforce policy
separation and, persistency, mediation, and policy domains.
Finally, (MacGraw, 2009) defines the concept of Risk Adaptable Access Control
(RADAC). In RADAC, the context of the information usage and the potential risk of
unauthorized disclosure are incorporated into the access control decision.

A conceptual

architecture for RADAC is illustrated if Figure 6.

Figure 6. Architecture for Risk Adaptable Access Control (Government, Global
Information Grid Information Assurance Reference Capabilities Document,
2004).
Note the inputs to the Security Risk Measurement and Operational Need Determination
Functions are included in the access decision. However, little research has been
conducted to date on how this information will be gathered or placed in an actionable
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format. The use of narrative to solicit this information may present the most viable nearterm solution for data collection and integration into the access decision function.

BARRIERS AND ISSUES
This section discusses the barriers and issues associated with security policy
definition and integration into the requirements and system design process.
Definition of Context
The dictionary definition of the word “context” is the “circumstances or events
that form the environment within which something exists or takes place (Oxford English
Dictionary). Describing the general context of an application would be an infinite
problem, as there are always new observations or attributes to incorporate into the
context. In (Covington, Srinivasan, Dey, Ahamad, & Abowd, 2001) the environmental
roles are defined as the security relevant aspects of the environment. The question then
becomes, which aspects of the environment are security relevant. These are contingent
on the various interpretations of the environment that each application uses for its access
control decisions. Covington further emphasizes that environmental roles are used to
maintain uniformity across a diverse environment. (p. 12). Further, those devices that
monitor the environmental conditions, the sensors, must be authenticated and the
integrity of their data guaranteed, or the environmental policy components could be
compromised.
(Strembeck, 2004) states: “every goal and obstacle can be used to define a
context condition and can map to a concrete access control service.” (p. 400). It becomes
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necessary, then, to have an environmental model in mind prior to exploring a contextbased security policy.

Conflicting Policies
(Wang & Livny, 2004) discuss the issue of policy reconciliation in heterogeneous
environments.

The notion of a reconciliation algorithm is introduced to find a security

policy that consistently adheres to the security policies of all participating domains (p. 1).
Wang’s model applies acyclic graph theory to model the security mechanisms employed
by various environments to provide a framework for policy an analysis. Further, the use
of acyclic graph theory exposes commonalities in policy and countermeasures to provide
an efficient reconciliation method (linear in size v. N-P-complete).
The computing landscape has matured to the point where basic security
mechanisms exist in most system architectures today. That is, there is some
authentication, access control, and domain separation supported by the majority of
operating systems; what differs is the degree of robustness and strength supported. With
the maturation of the security mechanisms, it becomes more feasible to define a
structured characterization of a system security environment using policy reconciliation.

The Existence of Supporting Modeling Tools and Concepts
(Jaeger, 2001) discusses the concept of safety in access control models. A safe
access control model is one in which a given access control will not inadvertently leak
access rights to unauthorized persons. Safe models require restrictive security policies,
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namely policies that apply constant values as constraints, because variable constraintbased policies are difficult to administer. (p. 158). Jaeger also applies graph theory to
design comprehensible security policies.
(Bertino, Ferrari, & Perlasca, 2001) presents a framework for logical reasoning
about access control models. In this framework, access control models are modeled in
the C-datalog language to develop a common basis for comparison.

The Existence of More Robust Security Models
In the early history of security technologies, security models reflected either
mandatory access controls (MAC) or discretionary access controls (DAC) as a security
mechanism. More flexible models such as RBAC were nonexistent in the formal sense.
The last 10 years have brought the concepts of Usage-controlled models (UCON)
(Sandhu R. , 2004) Type Enforcement, and other security models that provide a more
granular model of access control interactions.
For example, in Sandhu’s UCON model, the traditional lattice-based access
control models are used in conjunction with a policy-based authorization management
infrastructure. In the past, access decisions were binary; validated on an as-needed basis,
with the access maintained for the life of the session. The UCON model allows access
rights to change during the life of a session, treating access as a consumable, specifiable
event that can exist for a single object access or all attempted object access instances
within a session (p. 1).
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The Acceptance of Artificial Intelligence Tools to Facilitate Metapolicy Modeling
The existence of artificial intelligence tools that offered data reduction and the
ability to replicate results consistently has also been a relatively recent development.
Artificial intelligence techniques were not considered reliable – the results depended
upon the interpretation of the analysis and of the input data sets. As a result, the
technology was dismissed by all but the formal specification community.
In the mid-1990’s the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA)
instituted a new set of initiatives to improve the information assurance tool environment.
This initiative led to several developments in data visualization and intrusion detection
technologies. It also brought an increased acceptance of artificial intelligence tools and
techniques to the information assurance community.
For example, the use of directed acyclic graph theory to model RBAC and RBAC
constraints lends itself nicely to the use of Bayesian belief networks (Lueger). In this
case, a security policy structure can be represented as a graph, and the nodes of the graph
assigned probabilities commensurate with the potential for policy violation.
Similarly, (Lin, 2000) uses information tables to represent policy conflict analysis
among multiple security policies. The number of policies, and the number of issues that
can be potentially associated with each policy, lend themselves to the use of information
tables. The use of decision tree analysis techniques would potentially accommodate the
analysis of finer granularity security policies.
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The Realization that Policy Models are Contextual in Nature but must have a
Formal Foundation.
It is not sufficient to state a security policy without having a degree of formalism
attached to it. System consumers usually have no desire to learn or understand the formal
methods required to generate a sound security system. As succinctly stated in (Bell,
2005):
“The Bell-La Padula Model demonstrated the importance of a clear definition of
the “security” being addressed. Without a clear definition, one faces unending
complaints about “essential” aspects of security being omitted. How can you call
a system secure if it doesn’t prohibit (or require) N?”
Formal policy foundation mechanisms have not been readily available.

Design

languages that can address most aspects of a system’s context have only begun emerging
in the research community. (Alexander, 2006) describes the use of Rosetta as a system
level design language, as opposed to a software component level design language.
Rosetta addresses the systems engineering specialties such as reliability, maintainability,
and latency. In such a model, there is no reason why security cannot be addressed as the
specialty engineering discipline it is.

ASSUMPTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND DELIMITATIONS
This section of the dissertation discusses the context of the study.
Assumptions
(Edwards, 2005) states that the tradeoff between structure and unstructured
representations exists for many types of information, but is especially problematic for
contextual data for the following reasons:
•

Context represents information about people that is very often ambiguous by
nature, subtle in its interpretation, and can be applied to many uses.
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•

•

There is a great range of information about humans that is potentially useful
(ranging from general information about a user’s location or actions, to
domain-dependent information such as a user’s context in a specific
application).
Different sorts of context are important to different applications.

As such, we are assuming we can structure contextual data sufficiently for use within the
field of the study of security policy.
Limitations
The primary limitation of this research is the selection of an appropriate enterprise
level application with a sufficiently robust security context. An example with a
simplistic policy will be successful, but may yield results only marginally better than a
traditional digital access control policy. On the other hand, an example with a highly
complex policy may prove too difficult to model, or result in a narrative that is so
complex that the casual reader would prefer formal methods as a more comprehensible
approach.

Delimitations
To address all the factors associated with a meta-policy would be beyond the
scope of this investigation. Rather, the study is limited to the context of access control
policies, as defined in NIST 800-53 (Government, Special Publication 800-53 rev. 4, ,
2011). Table 1 enumerates the requirements family of access control requirements as
enumerated in NIST 800-53. The table presents the families of control requirements, and
enumerates them in alphabetical order.

The controls are marked as applicable to high,

medium, and low robustness systems, based upon the risk appetite deemed acceptable to
the system’s designated authorization authority.
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A system with a low robustness level

would have fewer access control requirements with lower levels of assurance associated
with them. A system with a high robustness level would have more stringent access
control requirements with higher levels of assurance associated with the correct operation
of the access controls.

NIST 800-53 defines three control baselines for automated

information systems, designated as high, medium, and low robustness.
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Table 1. Requirements family of access control from NIST 800-53.
Control	
  
Number	
  
AC-‐1	
  
AC-‐2	
  
AC-‐2	
  (1)	
  
AC-‐2	
  (2)	
  
AC-‐2	
  (3)	
  
AC-‐2	
  (4)	
  
AC-‐2	
  (5)	
  
AC-‐2	
  (6)	
  
AC-‐2	
  (7)	
  
AC-‐2	
  (8)	
  
AC-‐2	
  (9)	
  
AC-‐2	
  (10)	
  
AC-‐2	
  (11)	
  
AC-‐2	
  (12)	
  
AC-‐2	
  (13)	
  
AC-‐2	
  (14)	
  
AC-‐2	
  (15)	
  
AC-‐3	
  
AC-‐3	
  (1)	
  
AC-‐3	
  (2)	
  
AC-‐3	
  (3)	
  
AC-‐3	
  (4)	
  
AC-‐3	
  (5)	
  
AC-‐3	
  (6)	
  
AC-‐3	
  (7)	
  
AC-‐3	
  (8)	
  
AC-‐3	
  (9)	
  
AC-‐3	
  (10)	
  
AC-‐4	
  
AC-‐4	
  (1)	
  
AC-‐4	
  (2)	
  
AC-‐4	
  (3)	
  
AC-‐4	
  (4)	
  
AC-‐4	
  (5)	
  
AC-‐4	
  (6)	
  
AC-‐4	
  (7)	
  
AC-‐4	
  (8)	
  

Control	
  Name	
  
Control	
  Enhancement	
  Name	
  

Control	
  Baselines	
  
Low	
   Mod	
   High	
  

Access	
  Control	
  Policy	
  and	
  Procedures	
  
X	
  
X	
  
X	
  
Account	
  Management	
  
X	
  
X	
  
X	
  
Account	
  Management|	
  Automated	
  System	
  Account	
  Management	
  
	
  
X	
  
X	
  
Account	
  Management|	
  Removal	
  of	
  Temporary/Emergency	
  
	
  
X	
  
X	
  
Accounts	
  
Account	
  Management|	
  Disable	
  Inactive	
  Accounts	
  
	
  
X	
  
X	
  
Account	
  Management|	
  Automated	
  Audit	
  Actions	
  
	
  
X	
  
X	
  
Account	
  Management|	
  Inactivity	
  Logout/Typical	
  Usage	
  Monitoring	
  
	
  
	
  
X	
  
Account	
  Management|	
  Dynamic	
  Privilege	
  Management	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Account	
  Management|	
  Role-‐Based	
  Schemes	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Account	
  Management|	
  Dynamic	
  Account	
  Creation	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Account	
  Management|	
  Restrictions	
  on	
  Use	
  of	
  Shared	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Groups/Accounts	
  
Account	
  Management|	
  Shared/Group	
  Account	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Requests/Approvals	
  
Account	
  Management|	
  Shared/Group	
  Account	
  Credential	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Renewals	
  
Account	
  Management|	
  Usage	
  Conditions	
  
	
  
	
  
X	
  
Account	
  Management|	
  Account	
  Reviews	
  
	
  
	
  
X	
  
Account	
  Management|	
  Account	
  Monitoring/Atypical	
  Usage	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Account	
  Management|	
  Disable	
  Accounts	
  of	
  High-‐Risk	
  Individuals	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Access	
  Enforcement	
  
X	
  
X	
  
X	
  
Access	
  Enforcement|	
  Restricted	
  Access	
  to	
  Privileged	
  Functions	
  
Incorporated	
  into	
  AC-‐6	
  
Access	
  Enforcement|	
  Dual	
  Authorization	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Access	
  Enforcement|	
  Nondiscretionary	
  Access	
  Control	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Access	
  Enforcement|	
  Discretionary	
  Access	
  Control	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Access	
  Enforcement|	
  Security-‐Relevant	
  Information	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Access	
  Enforcement|	
  Protection	
  of	
  User	
  and	
  System	
  Information	
  
Incorporated	
  into	
  MP-‐
4	
  and	
  SC-‐28	
  
Access	
  Enforcement|	
  Mandatory	
  Access	
  Control	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Access	
  Enforcement|	
  Role-‐Based	
  Access	
  Control	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Access	
  Enforcement|	
  Revocation	
  of	
  Access	
  Authorizations	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Access	
  Enforcement|	
  Network	
  Access	
  Security-‐Related	
  Functions	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Information	
  Flow	
  Enforcement	
  
	
  
X	
  
X	
  
Information	
  Flow	
  Enforcement|	
  Object	
  Security	
  Attributes	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Information	
  Flow	
  Enforcement|	
  Processing	
  Domains	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Information	
  Flow	
  Enforcement|	
  Condition/Operational	
  Changes	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Information	
  Flow	
  Enforcement|	
  Content	
  Check	
  Encrypted	
  Data	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Information	
  Flow	
  Enforcement|	
  Embedded	
  Data	
  Types	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Information	
  Flow	
  Enforcement|	
  Metadata	
  
Information	
  Flow	
  Enforcement|	
  One-‐Way	
  Flow	
  Mechanisms	
  
Information	
  Flow	
  Enforcement|	
  Security	
  Policy	
  Filters	
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Table 1. Requirements family of access control from NIST 800-53 (cont.).
Control	
  
Number	
  
AC-‐4	
  (9)	
  
AC-‐4	
  (10)	
  
AC-‐4	
  (11)	
  
AC-‐4	
  (12)	
  
AC-‐4	
  (13)	
  
AC-‐4	
  (14)	
  
AC-‐4	
  (15)	
  
AC-‐4	
  (16)	
  
AC-‐4	
  (17)	
  
AC-‐4	
  (18)	
  
AC-‐4	
  (19)	
  
AC-‐4	
  (20)	
  
AC-‐4	
  (21)	
  
AC-‐5	
  
AC-‐6	
  
AC-‐6	
  (1)	
  
AC-‐6	
  (2)	
  
AC-‐6	
  (3)	
  
AC-‐6	
  (4)	
  
AC-‐6	
  (5)	
  
AC-‐6	
  (6)	
  
AC-‐6	
  (7)	
  
AC-‐6	
  (8)	
  
AC-‐7	
  
AC-‐7	
  (1)	
  
AC-‐7	
  (2)	
  
AC-‐8	
  
AC-‐9	
  
AC-‐9	
  (1)	
  
AC-‐9	
  (2)	
  
AC-‐9	
  (3)	
  
AC-‐9	
  (4)	
  
AC-‐10	
  
AC-‐11	
  
AC-‐11	
  (1)	
  

Control	
  Name	
  
Control	
  Enhancement	
  Name	
  
Information	
  Flow	
  Enforcement|	
  Human	
  Reviews	
  
Information	
  Flow	
  Enforcement|	
  Enable/Disable	
  Security	
  Policy	
  
Filters	
  
Information	
  Flow	
  Enforcement|	
  Configuration	
  of	
  Security	
  Policy	
  
Filters	
  
Information	
  Flow	
  Enforcement|	
  Data	
  Types	
  Identifiers	
  
Information	
  Flow	
  Enforcement|	
  Decomposition	
  into	
  Policy-‐
Relevant	
  Subcomponents	
  
Information	
  Flow	
  Enforcement|	
  Policy	
  Filter	
  Constraints	
  on	
  Data	
  
Structures	
  and	
  Content	
  
Information	
  Flow	
  Enforcement|	
  Detection	
  of	
  Unsanctioned	
  
Information	
  
Information	
  Flow	
  Enforcement|	
  Information	
  Transfers	
  on	
  
Interconnected	
  Systems	
  
Information	
  Flow	
  Enforcement|	
  Domain	
  Authentication	
  
Information	
  Flow	
  Enforcement|	
  Security	
  Attribute	
  Binding	
  
Information	
  Flow	
  Enforcement|	
  Protection	
  of	
  Metadata	
  
Information	
  Flow	
  Enforcement|	
  Classified	
  Information	
  
Information	
  Flow	
  Enforcement|	
  Physical/Logical	
  Separation	
  of	
  
Information	
  Flows	
  
Separation	
  of	
  Duties	
  
Least	
  Privilege	
  
Least	
  Privilege|	
  Authorize	
  Access	
  to	
  Security	
  Functions	
  
Least	
  Privilege|	
  Non-‐Privileged	
  Access	
  for	
  Nonsecurity	
  Functions	
  
Least	
  Privilege|	
  Network	
  Access	
  to	
  Privileged	
  Commands	
  
Least	
  Privilege|	
  Separate	
  Processing	
  Domains	
  
Least	
  Privilege|	
  Privileged	
  Accounts	
  
Least	
  Privilege|	
  Privileged	
  Access	
  by	
  Non-‐Organizational	
  Users	
  
Least	
  Privilege|	
  Review	
  of	
  User	
  Privileges	
  
Least	
  Privilege|	
  Privilege	
  Levels	
  for	
  Code	
  Execution	
  
Unsuccessful	
  Login	
  Attempts	
  
Unsuccessful	
  Login	
  Attempts|	
  Automatic	
  Account	
  Lock	
  
Unsuccessful	
  Login	
  Attempts|	
  Purge	
  Mobile	
  Device	
  
System	
  Use	
  Notification	
  
Previous	
  Logon	
  (Access)	
  Notification	
  
Previous	
  Logon	
  Notification|	
  Unsuccessful	
  Logons	
  
Previous	
  Logon	
  Notification|	
  Successful/Unsuccessful	
  Logons	
  
Previous	
  Logon	
  Notification|	
  Notification	
  of	
  Account	
  Changes	
  
Previous	
  Logon	
  Notification|	
  Additional	
  Logon	
  Information	
  
Concurrent	
  Session	
  Control	
  
Session	
  Lock	
  
Session	
  Lock|	
  Pattern	
  Hiding	
  Displays	
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Control	
  Baselines	
  
Low	
  

Mod	
   High	
  

	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

	
  
X	
  
X	
  
	
  
X	
  
X	
  
	
  
X	
  
X	
  
	
  
X	
  
X	
  
	
  
X	
  
X	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
X	
  
X	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
X	
  
X	
  
X	
  
Incorporated	
  into	
  AC-‐7	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
X	
  
X	
  
X	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
X	
  
	
  
X	
  
X	
  
Incorporated	
  into	
  AC-‐
11	
  

Table 1. Requirements family of access control from NIST 800-53 (cont.).
Control	
  
Number	
  
AC-‐12	
  
AC-‐13	
  

Control	
  Name	
  
Control	
  Enhancement	
  Name	
  
Session	
  Termination	
  
Supervision	
  and	
  Review	
  –	
  Access	
  Control	
  

AC-‐14	
  	
  
AC-‐14	
  (1)	
  

Permitted	
  Actions	
  without	
  Identification	
  or	
  Authentication	
  
Permitted	
  Actions	
  without	
  Identification	
  or	
  Authentication|	
  
Necessary	
  Uses	
  
AC-‐15	
  
Automated	
  Marking	
  
AC-‐16	
  	
  
Security	
  Attributes	
  
AC-‐16	
  (1)	
   Security	
  Attributes|	
  Dynamic	
  Attribute	
  Association	
  
AC-‐16	
  (2)	
   Security	
  Attributes|	
  Attribute	
  Value	
  Changes	
  by	
  Authorized	
  
Individuals	
  
AC-‐16	
  (3)	
   Security	
  Attributes|	
  Maintenance	
  of	
  Attribute	
  Associations	
  by	
  
Information	
  Systems	
  
AC-‐16	
  (4)	
   Security	
  Attributes|	
  Association	
  of	
  Attributes	
  by	
  Authorized	
  
Individuals	
  
AC-‐16	
  (5)	
   Security	
  Attributes|	
  Attribute	
  Displays	
  for	
  Output	
  Devices	
  
AC-‐16	
  (6)	
   Security	
  Attributes|	
  Maintenance	
  of	
  Attribute	
  Association	
  by	
  
Organization	
  
AC-‐16	
  (7)	
   Security	
  Attributes|	
  Consistent	
  Attribute	
  Interpretation	
  
AC-‐16	
  (8)	
   Security	
  Attributes|	
  Association	
  Techniques/Technologies	
  
AC-‐16	
  (9)	
   Security	
  Attributes|	
  Attribute	
  Reassignment	
  
AC-‐16	
  (10)	
   Security	
  Attributes|	
  Attribute	
  Configuration	
  by	
  Authorized	
  
Individuals	
  
AC-‐16	
  (11)	
   Security	
  Attributes|	
  Permitted	
  Attributes	
  for	
  Specified	
  
Information	
  Systems	
  
AC-‐16	
  (12)	
   Security	
  Attributes|	
  Permitted	
  Values	
  and	
  Ranges	
  for	
  Attributes	
  
AC-‐17	
  
Remote	
  Access	
  
AC-‐17	
  (1)	
   Remote	
  Access|	
  Automated	
  Monitoring/Control	
  
AC-‐17	
  (2)	
   Remote	
  Access|	
  Protection	
  of	
  Confidentiality/Integrity	
  Using	
  
Encryption	
  
AC-‐17	
  (3)	
   Remote	
  Access|	
  Managed	
  Access	
  Control	
  Rights	
  
AC-‐17	
  (4)	
   Remote	
  Access|	
  Privileged	
  Commands/Access	
  
AC-‐17	
  (5)	
   Remote	
  Access|	
  Monitoring	
  for	
  Unauthorized	
  Connections	
  
AC-‐17	
  (6)	
   Remote	
  Access|	
  Protection	
  of	
  Information	
  
AC-‐17	
  (7)	
   Remote	
  Access|	
  Additional	
  Protection	
  for	
  Security	
  Function	
  
Access	
  
AC-‐17	
  (8)	
   Remote	
  Access|	
  Disable	
  Nonsecure	
  Network	
  Protocols	
  
AC-‐17	
  (9)	
   Remote	
  Access|	
  Disconnect/Disable	
  Access	
  
AC-‐18	
  
Wireless	
  Access	
  
AC-‐18	
  (1)	
   Wireless	
  Access|	
  Authentication	
  and	
  Encryption	
  
AC-‐18	
  (2)	
   Wireless	
  Access|	
  Monitoring	
  Unauthorized	
  Connections	
  
AC-‐18	
  (3)	
   Wireless	
  Access|	
  Disable	
  Wireless	
  Networking	
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Control	
  Baselines	
  
Low	
  

Mod	
   High	
  

Incorporated	
  into	
  SC-‐10	
  
Incorporated	
  into	
  AC-‐2	
  
and	
  AU-‐6	
  
X	
  
X	
  
X	
  
Incorporated	
  into	
  AC-‐14	
  
Incorporated	
  into	
  MP-‐3	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  
X	
  
	
  
	
  

	
  
X	
  
X	
  
X	
  

	
  
X	
  
X	
  
X	
  

	
  
X	
  
X	
  
	
  
X	
  
X	
  
Incorporated	
  into	
  AC-‐17	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Incorporated	
  into	
  AC-‐3	
  
Incorporated	
  into	
  CM-‐7	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
X	
  
X	
  
X	
  
	
  
X	
  
X	
  
Incorporated	
  into	
  AC-‐18	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

Table 1. Requirements family of access control from NIST 800-53(cont.).
Control	
  
Number	
  

Control	
  Name	
  
Control	
  Enhancement	
  Name	
  

AC-‐18	
  (4)	
  
AC-‐18	
  (5)	
  
AC-‐19	
  
AC-‐19	
  (1)	
  

Wireless	
  Access|	
  Restrict	
  Configurations	
  by	
  Users	
  
Wireless	
  Access|	
  Confine	
  Wireless	
  Communications	
  
Access	
  Control	
  for	
  Mobile	
  Devices	
  
Access	
  Control	
  for	
  Mobile	
  Devices|	
  Use	
  of	
  Writable/Removable	
  
Media	
  
Access	
  Control	
  for	
  Mobile	
  Devices|	
  Use	
  of	
  Personally	
  Owned	
  
Removable	
  Media	
  
Access	
  Control	
  for	
  Mobile	
  Devices|	
  Use	
  of	
  Removable	
  Media	
  
with	
  No	
  Identifiable	
  Owner	
  
Access	
  Control	
  for	
  Mobile	
  Devices|	
  Restrictions	
  for	
  Classified	
  
Information	
  
Access	
  Control	
  for	
  Mobile	
  Devices|	
  Personally	
  Owned	
  Devices	
  
Access	
  Control	
  for	
  Mobile	
  Devices|	
  Full	
  Disk	
  Encryption	
  
Access	
  Control	
  for	
  Mobile	
  Devices|	
  Central	
  Management	
  of	
  
Mobile	
  Devices	
  
Access	
  Control	
  for	
  Mobile	
  Devices|	
  Remote	
  Purging	
  of	
  
Information	
  
Access	
  Control	
  for	
  Mobile	
  Devices|	
  Tamper	
  Detection	
  
Use	
  of	
  External	
  Information	
  Systems	
  
Use	
  of	
  External	
  Information	
  Systems|	
  Limits	
  on	
  Authorized	
  Use	
  
Use	
  of	
  External	
  Information	
  Systems|	
  Portable	
  Storage	
  Media	
  
Use	
  of	
  External	
  Information	
  Systems|	
  Personally	
  Owned	
  
Information	
  Systems/Devices	
  
Use	
  of	
  External	
  Information	
  Systems|	
  Network	
  Accessible	
  
Storage	
  Devices	
  
Collaboration	
  and	
  Information	
  Sharing	
  
Collaboration	
   and	
   Information	
   Sharing|	
   Automated	
   Decision	
  
Support	
  
Collaboration	
  and	
  Information	
  Sharing|	
  Information	
  Search	
  and	
  
Retrieval	
  
Publicly	
  Accessible	
  Content	
  
Data	
  Mining	
  Protection	
  
Access	
  Control	
  Decisions	
  
Access	
  Control	
  Decisions|	
  Transmit	
  Access	
  Authorization	
  
Information	
  
Access	
  Control	
  Decisions|	
  No	
  User	
  or	
  Process	
  Identity	
  
Reference	
  Monitor	
  Function	
  

AC-‐19	
  (2)	
  
AC-‐19	
  (3)	
  
AC-‐19	
  (4)	
  
AC-‐19	
  (5)	
  
AC-‐19	
  (6)	
  
AC-‐19	
  (7)	
  
AC-‐19	
  (8)	
  
AC-‐19	
  (9)	
  
AC-‐20	
  
AC-‐20	
  (1)	
  
AC-‐20	
  (2)	
  
AC-‐20	
  (3)	
  
AC-‐20	
  (4)	
  
AC-‐21	
  
AC-‐21	
  (1)	
  
AC-‐21	
  (2)	
  
AC-‐22	
  
AC-‐23	
  	
  
AC-‐24	
  
AC-‐24	
  (1)	
  
AC-‐24	
  (2)	
  
AC-‐25	
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Control	
  Baselines	
  
Low	
  

Mod	
   High	
  

	
  
	
  
X	
  
	
  
	
  
X	
  
X	
  
X	
  
X	
  
Incorporated	
  into	
  MP-‐7	
  
Incorporated	
  into	
  MP-‐7	
  
Incorporated	
  into	
  MP-‐7	
  
	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  

	
  
X	
  
	
  

	
  
X	
  
	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  
X	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

	
  
X	
  
X	
  
X	
  
	
  

	
  
X	
  
X	
  
X	
  
	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  
	
  

X	
  
	
  

X	
  
	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

X	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

X	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

X	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  

DEFINITION OF TERMS
The following terms are defined in this section with the origin of the definition in
parenthesis after the term.
Adequate Security
(OMB Circular A-130, Appendix III)

Security commensurate with the risk and
magnitude of harm resulting from the loss,
misuse, or unauthorized access to or
modification of information.

Assurance (CNSSI 4009)

Measure of confidence that the security
features,
practices,
procedures
and
architecture of an information system
accurately mediate and enforce the security
policy.

Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC)
(NIST 800-53)

Access control based on attributes associated
with and about subjects, objects, targets,
initiators, resources, or the environment. An
access control rule set defines the
combination of attributes under which an
access may take place.

Audit Log (CNSSI 4009)

A chronological record of information
system activities, including records of system
accesses and operations performed in a given
period.

Authentication (FIPS 200)

Verifying the identity of a user, process, or
device, often as a prerequisite to allowing
access to resources in an information system.

Availability (44 U.S. C., Sec. 3542)

Ensuring timely and reliable access to and
use of information.

Classified Information (NIST 800-53)

Information that has been determined:(i)
pursuant to Executive Order 12958 as
amended by Executive Order 13292, or any
predecessor Order, to be classified national
security information; or (ii) pursuant to the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to
be Restricted Data (RD).
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Baseline Configuration (NIST 800-53)

A documented set of specifications for an
information system, or a configuration item
within a system, that has been formally
reviewed and agreed on at a given point in
time, and which can be changed only through
change control procedures. The baseline
configuration is used as a basis for future
builds, releases, and/or changes.

Confidentiality (44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542)

Preserving authorized restrictions on
information access and disclosure, including
means for protecting personal privacy and
proprietary information.

Controlled
13556)

Unclassified

Data

(E.O. A categorical designation that refers to
unclassified information that does not meet
the standards for National Security
Classification under Executive Order 12958,
as amended, but is (i) pertinent to the
national interests of the United States or to
the important interests of entities outside the
federal government, and (ii) under law or
policy requires protection from unauthorized
disclosure, special handling safeguards, or
prescribed
limits
on
exchange
or
dissemination. Henceforth, the designation
CUI replaces Sensitive But Unclassified
(SBU)

Countermeasures (CNSSI 4009)

Actions, devices, procedures, techniques, or
other measures that reduce the vulnerability
of an information system. Synonymous with
security controls and safeguards.

Cyber Attack (CNSSI 4009)

An attack, via cyberspace, targeting an
enterprise’s use of cyberspace for the
purpose of disrupting, disabling, destroying,
or maliciously controlling a computing
environment/infrastructure; or destroying the
integrity of the data or stealing controlled
information.

Cyber Security (CNSSI 4009)

The ability to protect or defend the use of
cyberspace from cyber attacks.
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Cyberspace (CNSSI 4009)

A global domain within the information
environment consisting of the interdependent
network
of
information
systems
infrastructures including the Internet,
telecommunications networks, computer
systems, and embedded processors and
controllers.

Defense-in-Depth (NIST 800-53)

Information security strategy integrating
people,
technology,
and
operations
capabilities to establish variable barriers
across multiple layers and missions of the
organization.

Discretionary Access Control (NIST 800- A type of access control that restricts access
53)
to objects based on the identity of the
subjects or groups to which subjects belong.
The access controls are discretionary because
subjects with certain privileges are capable of
passing those privileges on to any other
subjects, either directly or indirectly.
Nondiscretionary access controls restrict this
capability.
Domain (CNSSI 4009)

An environment or context that includes a set
of system resources and a set of system
entities that have the right to access the
resources as defined by a common security
policy, security model, or security
architecture. See Security Domain.

Enterprise (CNSSI 4009)

An organization with a defined mission/goal
and a defined boundary, using information
systems to execute that mission, and with
responsibility for managing its own risks and
performance. An enterprise may consist of
all or some of the following business aspects:
acquisition, program management, financial
management
(e.g.,
budgets),
human
resources, security and information systems,
information, and mission management.
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Enterprise Architecture (CNSSI 4009)

The description of an enterprise’s entire set
of information systems:
how they are
integrated, how they interface to the external
environment at the enterprise’s boundary,
how they are operated to support the
enterprise mission, and how they contribute
to the enterprise’s overall security posture.

Identity-Based Access Control (NIST Access control based on the identity of the
800-53
user (typically relayed as a characteristic of
the process acting on behalf of that user)
where access authorizations to specific
objects are assigned based on the user’s
identity.
Information (CNSSI 4009)

Any communication or representation of
knowledge such as facts, data, or opinions in
any medium or form, including textual,
numerical, graphic, cartographic, narrative,
or audiovisual.

(FIPS 199)

An instance of an information type.

Information Owner (CNSSI 4009)

Official with statutory or operational
authority for specified information and
responsibility for establishing the controls for
its generation, collection, processing,
dissemination, and disposal.

Information Resources (44 U.S.C., Sec. Information and related resources, such as
3502)
personnel, equipment, funds, and information
technology.
Information Security (44 U.S.C., Sec The protection of information and
3542)
information systems from unauthorized
access, use, disclosure, disruption,
modification, or destruction in order to
provide confidentiality, integrity, and
availability.
Information Security Architecture (NIST An embedded, integral part of the enterprise
800-53)
architecture that describes the structure and
behavior for an enterprise’s security
processes, information security systems,
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personnel and organizational sub-units,
showing their alignment with the enterprise’s
mission and strategic plans.
Information Security Policy (CNSSI Aggregate of directives, regulations, rules,
4009)
and practices that prescribes how an
organization manages, protects, and
distributes information.
Information System (44 U.S.C., Sec. A discrete set of information resources
3502)
organized for the collection, processing,
maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or
disposition of information. (Note:
Information systems also include specialized
systems such as industrial/process control
systems, telephone switching and private
branch exchange (PBX) systems, and
environmental control systems.)
Information Security Risk (NIST 800-53)

Information System-Related
Risks (NIST 800-53)

Information Type (FIPS 199)

The risk to organizational operations
(including mission, functions, image,
reputation), organizational assets,
individuals, other organizations, and the
Nation due to the potential for unauthorized
access, use, disclosure, disruption,
modification, or destruction of information
and/or information systems.

Security Risks that arise through the loss of
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of
information or information systems and
consider impacts to the organization
(including assets, mission, functions, image
or reputation), individuals, other
organizations and the Nation. See Risk.
A specific category of information (e.g.,
privacy, medical, proprietary, financial,
investigative, contractor sensitive, security
management) defined by an organization or
in some instances by a specific law,
Executive Order, directive, policy, or
regulation.
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Integrity (44 U.S.C., Sec 3542)

Guarding against improper information
modification or destruction, and includes
ensuring information non-repudiation and
authenticity.

Label (NIST 800-53)

See Security Label.

Local Access (NIST 800-53)

Access to an organizational information
system by a user (or process acting on behalf
of a user) communicating through a direct
connection without the use of a network.

Malicious Code (NIST 800-53)

Software or firmware intended to perform an
unauthorized process that will have adverse
impact on the confidentiality, integrity, or
availability of an information system. A
virus, worm, Trojan horse, or other codebased entity that infects a host. Spyware and
some forms of adware are also examples of
malicious code.

Marking (NIST 800-53)

See Security Marking.

Media (FIPS 200)

Physical devices or writing surfaces
including, but not limited to, magnetic tapes,
optical disks, magnetic disks, Large-Scale
Integration (LSI) memory chips, and
printouts (but not including display media)
onto which information is recorded, stored,
or printed within an information system.

Metadata (NIST 800-53)

Information describing the characteristics of
data including, for example, structural
metadata describing data structures (e.g., data
format, syntax, and semantics) and
descriptive metadata describing data contents
(e.g., information security labels).

Network (CNSSI 4009)

Information system(s) implemented with a
collection of interconnected components.
Such components may include routers, hubs,
cabling, telecommunications controllers, key
distribution centers, and technical control
devices.
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Network Access (NIST 800-53)

Access to an information system by a user
(or a process acting on behalf of a user)
communicating through a network (e.g., local
area network, wide area network, Internet).

Nondiscretionary Access Control (NIST A type of access control that restricts access
800-53)
to objects based on the identity of subjects or
groups to which the subjects belong. The
access controls are nondiscretionary because
subjects with certain privileges are restricted
from passing those privileges on to any other
subjects, either directly or indirectly – that is,
the information system strictly enforces the
access control policy based on the rule set
established by the policy.
Object (NIST 800-53)

Passive information system-related entity
(e.g. devices, files, records, tables, processes,
programs, domains) containing or receiving
information. Access to an object (by a
subject) implies access to the information it
contains. See Subject.

Organization (FIPS 200)

An entity of any size, complexity, or
positioning within an organizational structure
(e.g., a federal agency or, as appropriate, any
of its operational elements.

Organizational User (NIST 800-53)

An organizational employee or an individual
the organization deems to have equivalent
status of an employee (e.g., contractor, guest
researcher, individual detailed from another
organization, individual from an allied
nation).

Privileged Account (NIST 800-53)

An information system account with the
authorizations of a privileged user.

Privileged User (CNSSI 4009)

A user that is authorized (and therefore,
trusted) to perform security-relevant
functions that ordinary users are not
authorized to perform.
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Remote Access (NIST 800-53)

Access to an organizational information
system by a user (or a process acting on the
behalf of a user) communicating through an
external network (e.g., the Internet).

Risk (FIPS 200)

A measure of the extent to which an entity is
threated by a potential circumstance or event,
and typically a function of (i) the adverse
impacts that would arise if the circumstance
or event occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of
occurrence.
Information system-related security risks are
those risks that arise from the loss of
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of
information or information systems and
reflect the potential adverse impacts to
organizational operations (including mission,
functions, image, or reputation),
organizational assets, individuals, other
organizations, and the Nation.

Risk Assessment (NIST 800-53)

The process of identifying risks to
organizational operations (including mission,
functions, image, reputation), organizational
assets, individuals, other organizations, and
the Nation, resulting from the operation of an
information system.
Part of risk management incorporates threat
and vulnerability analyses, and considers
mitigations provided by security controls
planned or in place. Synonymous with risk
analysis.

Risk Management (CNSSI 4009)

The program and supporting processes to
manage information security risk to
organizational operations (including mission,
functions, image, reputation), organizational
assets, individuals, other organizations, and
the Nation, and includes: (i) establishing the
context for risk related activities; (ii)
assessing risk; (iii) responding to risk once
determined; and (iv) monitoring risk over
time.
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Role-Based Access Control (NIST 800- Access control based on user roles (i.e., a
53)
collection of access authorizations a user
receives based on an explicit or implicit
assumption of a given role). Role
permissions may be inherited through a role
hierarchy and typically reflect the
permissions needed to perform defined
functions within an organization. A given
role may apply to a single individual or to
several individuals.
Security (CNSSI 4009)

A condition that results from the
establishment and maintenance of protective
measures that enable an enterprise to perform
its mission or critical functions despite risks
posed by threats to its use of information
systems. Protective measures may involve a
combination of deterrence, avoidance,
prevention, detection, recovery, and correct
that should form part of the enterprise’s risk
management approach.

Security Assurance (NIST 800-53)

See Assurance.

Security Attribute (NIST 800-53)

An abstraction representing the basic
properties or characteristics of an entity with
respect to safeguarding information; typically
associated with internal data structures (e.g.,
records, buffers, files), within the
information system and used to enable the
implementation of access control and flow
control policies, reflect special
dissemination, handling, or distribution
instructions, or support other aspects of the
information security policy.

Security Domain (CNSSI 4009)

A domain that implements a security policy
and is administered by a single authority.

Security Functions (NIST 800-53)

The hardware, software, and/or firmware of
the information system responsible for
enforcing the system security policy and
supporting the isolation of code and data on
which the protection is based.
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Security Label (NIST 800-53)

The means used to associate a set of security
attributes with a specific information object
as part of the data structure for that object.

Security Marking (NIST 800-53)

Human-readable information affixed to
information system components, removable
media, or output indicating the distribution
limitations, handling caveats, and applicable
security markings.

Security Policy (CNSSI 4009)

A set of criteria for the provision of security
services.

Security Requirements (FIPS 200)

Requirements levied on an information
system that are derived from applicable laws,
Executive Orders, directives, policies,
standards, instructions, regulations,
procedures, or organizational
mission/business case needs to ensure the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
the information being processed, stored, or
transmitted.

Security-Relevant Information

Any information within the information
system that can potentially impact the
operation of the security functions or the
provision of security services in a manner
that could result in failure to enforce the
system security policy or maintain isolation
of code and data.

Subject (NIST 800-53)

Generally an individual, process, or device
causing information to flow among objects or
change the system state. See Object.

Subsystem (NIST 800-53)

A major subdivision or component of an
information system consisting of
information, information technology, and
personnel that performs one or more specific
functions.

System (NIST 800-53)

See Information System.
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Threat (CNSSI 4009)

Trustworthiness (of an
System) (NIST 800-53)

Any circumstance or event with the potential
to adversely impact organizational operations
(including mission, functions, image, or
reputation, organizational assets, individuals,
other organizations, or the Nation through an
information system via unauthorized access,
destruction, disclosure, modification of
information, and/or denial of service.
Information The degree to which an information system
(including the information technology
components that are used to build the
system) can be expected to preserve the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
the information being processed, stored, or
transmitted by the system across the full
range of threats. A trustworthy information
system is a system that is believed to be
capable of operating within defined levels of
risk despite the environmental disruptions,
human errors, structural failures, and
purposeful attacks that are expected to occur
in its environment of operation.

User (CNSSI 4009)

Individual, or (system) process acting on
behalf of an individual, authorized to access
an information system.

Vulnerability (CNSSI 4009)

Weakness in an information system, system
security procedures, internal controls, or
implementation that could be exploited or
triggered by a threat source.
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SUMMARY
In conclusion, we have presented the case for a more comprehensible system
security policy definition; one that could be used to elicit information required for various
security policy models and support a degree of formalism that would be amenable to
formal methods and logical proof if desired.

More significantly, this policy elicitation

through the use of structured storytelling would be a less intimidating, more descriptive
technique that would lend itself to contextual security information such as that required
for risk adaptive access control models.
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature
This section describes the relevant research literature associated with this proposal. For
completeness and clarity, this chapter addresses four distinct fields of research:
•
•
•
•

Security policies and modeling,
The use of artificial intelligence techniques,
The use of storytelling as a design tool, and
Computer assisted storytelling techniques.

The combination of these fields of study forms the basis for the research.
Security Policies and Modeling
In its most basic form, access control prevents unauthorized use of resources
(Ferraiolo, D., Barkley, J.F., & Kuhn, D.R., 1999). It involves an access controller that
grants or denies the request of a subject to perform an operation on an object according to
the access control policy. The subject identifies an entity and its accompanying
attributes. The operation makes information flow to or from the object: It is either read
or written to system resources. The operation includes access and the accompanying
activities of collection, storage, processing and distribution of information. The access
policy specifies the usage rights of the subject to perform the operation on the object.
The access controller executes subject authentication and access authorization. The
access controller performs subject authentication on the basis of the Token (T) and a
Subject Identity (SID). The access controller performs access authorization by
determining the Permission of the Subject to execute the Operation on the Object.
Figure 7 illustrates this information flow.
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Access Policy
(Permissions per subject)

(SID, T)

Access
Controller

Supporting
Information

Grant/Deny
Subject
(Principal)

Operation

Object
(Resource)

?

Figure 7 – The access control process (Hulsebosch, et al, 2005).
Access control can be further delineated into real time access controls and nonreal time access controls.

Figure 8 represents a workflow for non-real-time access

control. Figure 9 represents a workflow for real-time access control decisions.
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Figure 8. The general process flow of non-real time access control (NIST, 2010, p.3).
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Figure 9. The process flow of real time access control decisions (NIST, 2010, p.3).
The process flow of dynamic access control policies can be generalized as shown
in Figure 10.

In this model, the activities of policy creation, conflict resolution,

promulgation, and enforcement are decoupled steps in the policy distribution process.
That is, a policy can be created, but may conflict with other operational needs and require
resolution of such conflicting operations prior to distribution and enforcement at all nodes
in a system.
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Figure 10. Processing flow to promulgate a dynamic access control policy (U.S.
Government, 2004, p.3-25)
(Burnside & Keromytis, 2007) state: traditional access control mechanisms
used in enterprise networks operate independently on each service. When a user issues a
request to a network service, the service’s access-control mechanism independently uses
its security policy to make a decision on how to handle the request, and then goes
inactive.

There may be information relevant to the decision elsewhere in the network,

but the decision is made without consulting other network entities, so the component may
arrive at a locally correct, but globally wrong decision.
Role-based Access Control
As has been stated above, RBAC was designed to better accommodate the actual
usage scenarios of the civil government and commercial organizations. Sandhu, Kuhn,
and Ferraiolo (Sandhu, Kuhn, & Ferraiolo, 2000) formalized the definition of RBAC, and
subsequently RBAC has been defined as an ANSI Standard (NCITS, 2004). RBAC as a
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model has been further formalized in (Gligor, 1995) (Park, Neven, & Diosomito, 2004)
(Han, 2000) and many others. RBAC has become the accepted implementation of access
control in most commercial operating systems. This has several benefits for system
administrators, because in most organizations there are well-defined roles that can be
institutionalized across the enterprise. (Park, Neven, & Diosomito, 2004) defines three
tiers of RBAC constraints within an enterprise: the organizational hierarchy, the
enterprise hierarchy, and the system hierarchy, and suggests these hierarchies can be
interrelated and reused amongst organizations. Figure 11 illustrates an RBAC
implementation.
There has been recent work to extend RBAC to address attribute based access
control (ABAC) within the RBAC model (Kuhn, 2010). Attribute based access control is
based upon the user possessing a given attribute in his credentials to meet a rule for
access to be granted (Karp, 2009). ABAC is easy to establish, but difficult to change, and
RBAC requires considerable attention to support sound role creation. (Kuhn, 2010)
proposes to apply a role structure to attributes that are relatively static, simplifying
ABAC and supporting a more efficient attribute change process.
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Figure 11 – An architecture for RBAC Implementation (Sherwood, Clark, & Lynas,
2008, p. 241)
Trust-based access control (TrustBAC) was proposed by (Chakraborty S. & Ray,
I.., 2006) as a solution to provide increased flexibility for RBAC-type access models.
TrustBAC is useful in decentralized models where the user population is dynamic and the
identity of all users is not known in advance. TrustBAC uses the authentication
credentials of the user to create a binary trust relationship: a user is either trusted or he is
not. Trust levels are introduced to address a user’s contextual credentials such as the
user’s behavior history, and reputation. These trust levels are then mapped to user roles
and their associated permissions.
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Context-based Access Control
With the advent of wireless networks and intelligent devices, ubiquitous
computing brought a new collection of access control policy issues. (Hengartner,
2004) discusses the security issues associated with people location information, such
as how much information should be shared about a person’s location. Device privacy
scenarios were introduced, where a person’s laptop or PDA may divulge their
location without the owner’s permission. In this case, access controls were
established to the device location services and the person location services, and the
information was protected in transit via conventional encryption technology.
Ardanga, et.al. (2006) discussed integration of location-based conditions with access
controls to accommodate mobile user interaction. In this model, access is specified
in terms of position, movement, and interaction of the user. For example, if a user is
within a given area, and moving slowly enough, access can be granted.

Spatial Security Policies
Location based services and mobile applications bring unique access control
requirements to security policy models. For example, consider the scenario of “If
it’s my wife, I’ve just left” when the person is still in the office. There have been
numerous location alibis’ that have been denounced as the result of electronic toll
collection transactions (Klunder). (Bertino, Catania, Damiani, & Perlasca, 2005),
define a geospatial framework for RBAC policies that accommodates a spatiallyware access control attribute (p.30). Using the Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC)
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spatial model (OpenGIS Consortium, 1999) a boundary perimeter can be associated
with a user role, creating a binding between a user’s location and the access control
policy. For example, if the user is not within the building, he may not be permitted to
view proprietary information.
In (Lei, Daby, Davis, Banavar & Ebling), the concept of context awareness
was introduced, where an application adapts to the environment to fulfill the needs of
the user. Lei discusses providing context awareness as a service to a user’s
application environment, so the most appropriate presentation methods can be applied
for data. For example, a low bandwidth connection may not be suited to a graphicsrich web environment or situational display. The concept of a controller is introduced
to specify the user’s context, an owner to specify how data is disseminated, and a
client or application to collect authorized information. While not an access control
policy as such, the specification of a context service provides an illustrative example
of how ubiquitous devices apply contextual access management.
Within an RBAC environment, (Strembeck, 2004) proposes that contextual
constraints can be considered a special purpose RBAC mechanism. In this model,
contextual constraints are subject to dynamic checking against predefined conditions
or specified values. Strembeck makes the distinction between static constraints that
are specified at constraint establishment against constant values, as opposed to
dynamic constraints that are evaluated against specific run-time parameters or
variables. (pp. 395-396). The notion of conditional permission is presented and
defined as the case of access being granted if and only if each contextual constraint
associated with that access evaluates as a true statement. Using context constraints
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allows the traditionally static RBAC policy to incorporate dynamic data in its role
evaluation processing.
(Covington, Srinivasan, Dey, Ahamad, & Abowd, 2001) also discuss contextbased security, introducing the notion of environmental roles. In this presentation,
the context is that of a context aware environment, in which the behavior of the
applications is tailored based on the user’s environmental context. For example, an
intelligent entertainment system may increase the volume and change the station on
the radio depending upon whether the user is at work or at home.

In this model, the

environmental state must be semantically represented, and the rules associated with
that state captured for environmental context to be used for access management.

Risk Adaptive Access Controls (RAdAC)
Pervasive connectivity does not accommodate static security policy modeling
well. To address the dynamic nature of policy management and policy-based access
controls, Risk Adaptive Access Control (RAdAC) models have been proposed
(McGraw, 2004). These models address security based on the premise that
information should be shared by default, as opposed to static need-to-know based
models that by default protect information and make it unavailable for use. RAdAC
uses the dimensions of security risk and operational need in addition to the
classification of the information and the clearance of the user (Choudhary, 2005 ,p.
294). For example, a unit on the front lines has a very strong operational need to
know opposing military troop movements, but might be denied that information if not
deployed. RAdAC is an early attempt to adapt security policy to digital information
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timelines as opposed to paper document models (p.294). RAdAC models make
access control decisions based upon the following components (p.295):
• Characteristics of people
• Characteristics of IT Components
• Characteristics of content objects
• Environmental factors
• Situational factors
• Heuristics
• Digital Access Control Policies
• Access Authorization Operator Interaction
• User requests for access to a resource
• Decision history and supporting rationale.
Essentially, various policy elements are maintained in policy information bases
(PIBs) (p. 295) and retrieved as required to address access requests. If a request is
granted, the information is presented to the user. If a request is denied, subsequent
PIBs are consulted, and the disposition of the request is based upon security
heuristics or rules engines as well as static attributes associated with the user and the
data.

Context Sensitive Access Control
Context sensitive access control policies focus on the situational environment
to determine if the user should be granted access to services (Hulsebosch, Salden,
Bargh, & Ebben, 2005 p. 111). In this model, the effective security controls of the
physical world are used to define access controls. These may be based upon location,
velocity, age, device and/or network capabilities, temperature, time of day, and
possibly the user’s intentions (p. 112). If the patterns of behavior that can be derived
from contextual information can be captured and grouped, an effective variant of
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role-based access control can be created. In this model, the access controller has to
verify the contextual attributes provided by the subject to authenticate the subject’s
request. The access controller also has to bind the permissions in the access policy
to the subject’s contextual attributes to perform the access authorization function.
While context sensitive access control does require an infrastructure to collect,
manage, and interpret contextual information, most of these functions could be
performed as background tasks (p. 117). The ability to apply contextual data to
access control decisions would provide a more realistic model of access decision
making in computing environments.

Usage Based Access control
An advantage to ubiquitous computing environments is transparent access to
information without regard for the underlying computing infrastructure (Wang, Zang,
& Cao, 2006). Within these environments, the mobility of the users presents
challenges in the determination of the user’s contextual information and
authentication. Usage-based access control models augment traditional access
control models with two additional elements:
1. Obligations – requirements that have to be followed by the subject to
allow access to resources, and
2. Conditions – subject and object independent requirements that have to be
passed to the access controller.
Figure 12 illustrates the components of a usage based access control model.
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Figure 12 – Usage based access control attributes.
Collaborative Access Control Models

In the Web 3.0 world, collaborative systems become more prevalent. Groups
of users communicate and cooperate to address a common task (Tolone, Ahn, & Pai,
2005). Information in collaborative applications may be of varied sensitivity. The
collaborative environment allows users to create, manipulate, and provide access to
information and resources. Collaboration depends upon making information
available to those with a need to know, whereas access control models restrict access
to information based upon the user’s defined confidentiality, integrity, or availability
constraints. In collaborative access control models:
•
•

Access control must be applied and enforced at a distributed platform
level.
Should be expressive enough to specify access rights efficiently based
upon varied information.
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•
•
•
•
•

Must scale to address the number of shared operations expected in
collaborative multi-user environments.
Support access decisions for resources and information at varying
levels of granularity.
Support transparent access for authorized users and strong exclusion of
unauthorized users; yet support unrestrained collaboration.
Allow high-level specification of access rights, to facilitate complexity
management.
Support dynamic modification at runtime to reflect the environment or
collaboration dynamics.

Along with traditional access control models, the concept of Team based access
control (Thomas, 1997) is examined to provide integration of user context and object
context into the access control space. Figure 13 illustrates TBAC’s information flow.

Team
roles

User
Context

Team Permissions

Collaboration
Context
(runtime binding)

Object
types

Object
Context

Object Instances

Team Members

Figure 13 – The Team Based access control model (Tolone, et al, p. 36).
The authors then proceed to contrast and compare existing access control models,
searching for the best fit of characteristics that address collaborative architectures. A
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context based access control model is suggested that accommodates dynamic user
participation and fine grained object models.

Semantic Access Controls
(Pan, Mitra, & Liu, 2006) propose the use of semantically enhanced rolebased access control to facilitate database interoperability. Their model incorporates
ontology mapping to accommodate semantic heterogeneity in conjunction with
confidentiality constraints associated with data sharing among organizations. They
contend that preserving access control across semantically heterogeneous information
systems is more accurately termed semantic access control. When a query is issued
that may cross database boundaries, the roles, tables, and columns are validated
against the corresponding roles, tables, and columns of the other databases within an
information system. Access controls are translated in real time in response to a
subject’s query. Figure 14 illustrates the semantic access control model.
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Figure 14 – Information flow in the semantic access control model (Pan, Mitra, &
Liu, p. 240).
THE USE OF VARIOUS ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TECHNIQUES
As is evident from the discussion above, there is no shortage of formal policy
models.

What is lacking are techniques for integrating the formalism of policy

modeling with policy elicitation mechanisms to understand the rules a customer
wishes to enforce upon information sharing. In this section, we explore the relevant
contributions from the fields of artificial intelligence to this effort.
(Atallah,

McDonough, Raskin, & Nirenburg, 2000) presented four areas

where natural language processing techniques could benefit the information security
community. One of these four areas was the area of ontology and its application to
machine translation techniques.

This research team had developed a semi-

automatically acquired ontology, with a semi-automatically acquired lexicon for over
40,000 words.

Further, an analyzer was created to translate text from a natural

language into a text-meaning representation and a generator to translate the text
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meaning representation into a given natural language.

This use of ontological

semantics was being applied to the problem of document sanitization or redaction,
where some text needs to be removed before a document is approved for public
release. Essentially, the workings of a human reviewer were modeled and codified
into a rule base that applied Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques.
Of interest: the authors state that the primary function of natural language is
communication among humans (p. 64), the most common mode that of factconveying. In this mode, the speaker and the listener are committed to the literal
truth of what is said, but each interprets it differently based upon their understanding.
In Natural Language Processing, this brings to bear the problems of
underspecification, namely vagueness and ambiguity.

Simply put, no one spoken

sentence can capture all the semantic meaning of a given context. The human mind
applies prior knowledge and inferences to fill in the missing data.
Subsequently, (Raskin, Hempelmann, & Triezenberg, 2004) presented an
experiment in ontological semantics as a a technique to determine deception. The
approach proposed represents words as meanings, including the sentences and their
text, and performs logical manipulation; resulting in a system that can identify
specific facts or events that contribute to the deception and of understanding what the
truth behind the deception is. (Raskin, Hempelmann, Nierenberg, & Triezenberg,
2001) further define a comprehensive ontology for the domain of information
assurance, providing a sound foundation for further research in the domain.
(Owen, Wakeman, Keller, Weeds, & Weir, 2005) discuss pervasive
computing environments and conclude that non-technical users will want to be able to
configure their own devices.

In their research, a series of user studies were

conducted to determine how people define the term “configuration.”

Once the

meaning of system configuration was defined, it was possible to determine a
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formalism and create a natural language processing system to address the question,
with a policy management engine to enforce system configuration policies.

The

authors conclude that description logic is a powerful formalism for policy
representation, and that the state of natural language processing is getting close to
direct policy conversion to machine language. Therefore, for at least one welldefined domain, natural language machine processing is quite feasible.
(Shi & Chadwick, 2011) state that when asked, users already intuitively know
the access control policy associated with a given set of resources. If asked, the person
will say yes or no according to a set of rules associated with their domain. However,
translation of those rules into an executable policy requires specialized knowledge the
user may not have. To counter this knowledge gap, the authors created a controlled
natural language interface to allow the user to enter the policy, which is then
translated to OWL’s relational ontology or XACML.

Roles are created first, then

permissions are assigned to each role to implement the controls. These capabilities
are then parsed by a natural language parser to create rules that can be exported to the
desired format. User trials were conducted with instructions to create a short policy
from a given usage scenario,
correctness.

and evaluated against XACML statements for

The natural language interface scored approximately sixty percent

satisfaction in trials. The authors contend that because natural language can specify
the same fact in several different manners, the parser does not interpret them all
congruently.

The existing prototype does not address complex conditional policy

statements that would be needed to enforce constraint based security policies.
Finally, we examine PolicyMorph, a constraint system that supports
interactive policy development and maintenance as Access Decision Functions (ADF)
(LeMay, Fatemieh, & Gunter, 2007). PolicyMorph is designed to interactively assist
administrators with attribute based access control constraints.
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The tool reports

constraint violations and suggests resolutions to them in priority order.

Further,

PolicyMorph does not force the administrator to encode all constraints in formal
language prior to analysis. Both an ABAC policy language and a logical constraint
language are embodied in the authoring environment, and both are based on firstorder logic and encoded in Prolog. The authors present a case study embodying
separation of duty constraints. The resulting output does prioritize conflicts, but does
not appear user friendly. The authors indicate a graphical user interface is their next
priority to allow less sophisticated users to apply the environment.
(Reeder, Karat, Karat, & and Brodie, 2007)

address usability challenges in

security and privacy policy authoring interfaces.

They state that as pervasive

computing grows, users who will have to specify security policy will become less
sophisticated in their expertise. Therefore, usable policy-authoring interfaces are
becoming more necessary in the marketplace. Using IBM’s SPARCLE workbench as
an environment, they conducted a usablity study on policy authoring. There were
five general challenges that must be addressed if a policy authoring infrastructure will
be useful:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

support for object grouping,
enforcement of consistent terminology,
making default rules clear,
communicating and enforcing rule structures, and
preventing rule conflicts.
A usability study was conducted with summer office interns, who were

considered novice application users.

Data collected during the study included the

text of rules written, video of the subject and the computer screen, any think-aloud
audio, and a demographic survey. Output was examined to address rule syntax, and
then user activities were analyzed to determine if the subject was able to self-correct
problem rules in the process. The results of their study corroborated the usability
issues presented as the primary issues in creating a usable policy authoring interface.
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Essentially, users do not wish to input large lists of data with minimal feedback as to
the correctness of syntax.
(Johnson, Karat, Karat, & and Gruenberg, 2010) discuss using policy
templates to facililty security policy authoring to proivde consistent policy interfaces
across diverse policies. The templates are designed to provide a structured format to
capture data.

Iterative policy refinement is applied to address policy authoring,

template authoring, and policy element definition as distinct steps in the policy
creation process.

The use of a structured template, in conjunction with the three

roles associated with policy authoring, proved quite useful and policies could be
created by less sophisticated users. The authors are exploring how to extract network
resources to present the user with policy options appropriate for the domain of use.
(Johnson, Karat, Karat, & and Gruenberg, Optimizing a Policy Authoring
Framework for Security and Privacy Policies, 2010) conducted further research in
policy authoring with templates and determine that there were three additional criteria
that needed to be added to policy authoring environments:
1. Support for appropriate limitations of expressivity (allow writing of deny
policies or allow policies, but not both).
2. Communicate risks and threats associated with a given policy.
3. Provide access to the metadata for reference purposes.
The author’s stress the need for extensibility in policy authoring tools to
facilitate development of sound policy that matches the user’s intended purpose.
As early as 1987 (Ayuso, Varda, & Weischedel, 1987) stated: “the success of
all National Language Interface technology is predicated upon the availability of
substantial knowledge bases containing information about the syntax and semantics
of words, phrases, and idioms, as well as knowledge of the domain and of discourse
context.
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Semantic knowledge includes at least two kinds of information: selectional
restrictions or case frame constraints which can serve as a filter on what makes sense
semantically, and rules for translating the word senses present in an input into an
underlying semantic representation. Beyond these elements:
•

•
•

Basic facts about the domain must be acquired, at minimum taxonomic
information about the semantic categories in the domain and binary
relationships between semantic categories.
Knowledge that relates the predicates in the domain to their representation and
access in the underlying systems.
Sets of domain plans to allow understanding of narrative and to follow the
structure of discourse. Otherwise known as being able to interpret narrative
in the context of stated future direction.
In IRAQ, there are 3 levels of representation for the concepts, actions, and

capabilities of the domain. The domain model is separate from the model of the
entities in the underlying system.
(Edwards, 2005) stated that a variety of tradeoffs that have to be made
between structured and unstructured representations for many types of information.
These trades become especially problematic in the case of contextual information for
the following reasons:
•

•

•

Context represents information about people that is very often
ambiguous by nature, subtle in its interpretation, and can be applied to
many uses.
There is a great range of information about humans that is potentially
useful (ranging from general information about users’ locations or
actions, to domain-dependent information such as a user’s context in a
specific application).
Different sorts of context are important to different applications.

While highly structured data representations are amenable to use by applications
(they can be easily machine parsed, processed and stored) they are problematic in
situations where the needs of the applications are evolving; where the range of
information that must be represented is very great; and when agreement among
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multiple applications is required, in other words, the very situations posed by contextaware computing.
Storytelling As A Design Tool
In Human Computer Interaction, a mental model is a set of assumptions or
beliefs about how a system works. People interact with systems according to their
beliefs and assumptions about the system. Constantine and Lockwood (1999) define
4 criteria for product usability: learnability, retainability, efficiency of use, and user
satisfaction. Learnability and retainability reflect on the role of mental models in
usability. To the extent that a correct mental model could be learned and retained by
the user, the user will become more effective.
Asgharpour, Liu, & Camp (2007) discuss five widely used conceptual mental
models of security risks implicit in language or explicit in metaphors:
1. Physical safety – implicit in descriptions of locks and keys. This concept
implies individual and localized control.
2. Medical Infections – security incidents interpreted as medical infections
are grounded in the patterns of diffusion of malicious code as infectious
diseases, and the importance of heterogeneity in the larger network,
conceptualized as an ecosystem of security.
3. Criminal behavior – security violations can be crimes or may seem to be
criminal. The concept of computer risks as risk of being a victim of crime
implies that users or machines are targeted.
4. Warfare – implies the existence of a determined, implacable enemy, with
the potential to leverage horror by leveraging the horrors or war.
5. Economic Failure – Security and network or software vulnerabilities can
be seen as market failures. Vulnerabilities are perceived as external
events; security failures cause downtime and expenses.
(Wash & Rader, 2011) discussed mental models, or how a user thinks about a
problem, the model in the person’s mind of how things work. The model allows the
person to make decisions about the effects of various actions. For example, if hackers
are perceived to be curious teenagers, the threat of criminal activity is perceived to be
low. The critical point about mental models is that even if they are incorrect, they can
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still lead to good security behaviors and more secure computer systems.

Further,

mental models of security threats are based on reasoning about information provided
by stories recounted by friends and colleagues.

This has been described as a folk

model or lay theory created out of shared community experiences.

Wash further

states that to improve home security get home computer users to train each other and
create good mental models.
Users rely on others for security because they feel like they don’t have the
skills to maintain proper security themselves, so they often try to avoid security
decisions (p. 3). They find ways to delegate the responsibility to some external entity
defined as technological (a firewall), social (another person or IT staff) or
institutional (a bank). Three common approaches to address this issue are:
1. Technical solutions to take the decision out of the end users’ hands.
The stupid human approach requires a one size fits all security
solution, but people use computers in vary diverse ways.
2. Educational approaches try to teach the details of computer security.
As long as it isn’t too complicated it stands a chance, at least in the
short term.
3. How to support and encourage good behavior. How do people form
their perceptions?
Wash & Rader believe that people form mental models of threats to security based
on information they receive in the form of stories from other people like themselves,
from their media, and from their experience.

A “mental model is a cognitive

representation in a person’s mind of how things work: how a person reasons and
makes inferences about a situation, allow people to make predictions about what
might happen, and provide heuristics and guidelines to base behavioral choices (p.
1).” The mental model provides a chain of theories that help us reason about what to
do next.
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Social information sharing is an important way that we learn about the world
around us and our behavior in the world. Narratives, stories told by other people, are
an important component of our ability to learn about the world around us and behave
appropriately. Stories tell people about each other, acting as observational learning
and helping to avoid other’s mistakes. Stories about others reveal useful information
about how culture and society operate. Stories provide a way to learn from other’s
experience. Stories that affirm what is already represented in our mental models are
remembered more easily, are given more weight, and are more likely to be passed on.
(Triantafyllakos, Palaigeorgiou, & Tsoukalas, 2008) present the argument that
collaborative design is actually a narrative, a way to deconstruct the design process.
They propose the theory that output of collaboration is actually a design story, in that
it is the result of a chain of events and the interaction of a collection of characters.
Further, the way that output is communicated is also a story in that it is the story of
the item being designed, the people that will use it, and the affect caused by the use of
the item. Designers and customers become readers and actors in the design process
story and co-authors of the product.

The design team leader becomes the narrator,

and, in the delivery of the product, becomes the critical reader of the story.
Chatham (Chatham, 1978) discusses the author as the manipulator of narrative
elements including character, setting, and events to construct the design story that is
recounted and revised throughout the design process. Chatham states that narrative
transmission is concerned with the manner in which the story’s events are presented
during the recounting of the narrative. The most important aspect of the narrative
transmission in Chatham’s model is the organization of the story’s events, when the
narrative begins, climaxes, and ends. Different design processes may have different
stories, and different end products.
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The designer is responsible for structuring the process such that the design
stays on cost and schedule while accommodating the design team’s creativity and
innovation throughout the narrative (Triantafyllakos, Palaigeorgiou, & Tsoukalas,
2008, p. 212). In this role the team leader is responsible for the maintenance of the
team’s inner monologue as it progresses through the various design decisions and
events.
(Erickson, 1996) talks about story as an integral part of the design process, a
technique to generate discussion, inform the user, and persuade the users. Design is
a collaborative activity between the designer and the customer, and has become a
distributed social process as enterprise applications have grown in scope and
structure. Erickson uses story as a change management tool, to make the user feel in
control of his situation when technology is overwhelming the situation The metric is
not the story itself, but the fact that the audience relates to it and responds, offering
opinions on topics that they may not have otherwise offered inputs about.

Stories

help define what is important, what the user’s environment is like, and set the stage
for more formal design methods. Finally, stories are memorable, in that a good story
is talked about with others and they are relatively informal.

They are not expected

to be precise, so they discuss the issues, not the minituae that delay the design
process.
Computer Assisted Storytelling and Analysis
In (Nissan, 2008), narrative is proposed as a communication medium among
avatars in a virtual world or robots performing a collective function.

Nissan

observes that “narrative is pervasive; even the reasoning process unfolds in a
narrative way (p. 518).

“At a formal level, narrative governs argument in that

arrangement, the ordering or internal progression of a discourse, depends upon a
narrative structure in which a premise is elaborated, developed, proved or refuted.
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Narrative as arrangement is in this sense intrinsic to logic as well as to dialectic and
rhetoric” (Goodrich, 2007, p. 348 in Nissan, 2008).
Further on, Nissan quotes (Ryan, 2005, p.347) in the definition of a story:
1. The mental representation of a story involves the construction
of the mental image of the world populated with individual
agents (characters) and objects (spatial dimension).
2. The world must undergo not fully predictable changes of state
that are caused by non-habitual physical events: either
accidents (“happenings”) or deliberate actions by intelligent
agents (temporal dimension).
3. In additon to being linked to physical states by causal relations,
the physical events must be assoicated with mental states and
events (goals, plans, emotions). This network of connections
gives events coherence, motivation, closure, and intelligibility
and turns them into a plot (logical, mental, and formal
dimension).
Essentially, a story lives in five distinct dimensions (spatial, temporal,
logical, mental, and formal). In working with robots or virtual avatars, Nissan poses
that what is habitual or routine can be captured in a behavioral specification language,
and what in non-routine is significant.

The non-routine activity can then be

processed against known patterns of activity (p.518).
At this point Nissan moves into a discussion on the analysis of common folk
tales. Folk tales are inspired by some historical event that has been adapted to the
current situation. In this manner, events are handed down through the oral tradition
and are transformed by being brought into harmony with the thematic patterns of the
current day.

For example, Rumpelstilskin was originally documented by the

Brothers Grimm in the 1812 Edition of Children’s and Household Tales.

The folk

tale exists across the Scandinavian and European countries in various forms.
Further, we can recognize the situational pattern in current society:
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“Rumpelstiltskin Syndrome” is an analogical reference to the role of
the king in the story of Rumpelstiltskin. Common practice in middle
management is to impose unreasonable work demands on
subordinates. Upon completion of the task or tasks in question, equal
or higher work demands are then imposed; moreover, no credit,
acknowledgement, or overt appreciation is demonstrated by way of
recognition” (Beatie, 1976).
Nissan makes the case that robotic operations can be defined by a taxonomy
of situations (p. 524). This taxonomy can apply the thematic patterns of folktales,
which have already been extracted in the work of Vladimir Popp (Popp, 1968); who
proposed a mathematical model for the thematic patterns in folktales, which can be
adapted for machine generated narrative. Popp’s work facilitated the creation of story
grammars and automatic story processing. Popp postulated that there were twentytwo specific folktale functions, or actions, and nine more that were considered
preparatory functions in the story introductions. Aarne and Thompson (Uther, 2004)
classified folktale narratives into categories of stories based on the actions and moral
lessons to be learned.
(Cavazza M. and Pizzi, 2006) provides a critical overview and introduction to
interactive storytelling systems, which integrates artificial intelligence techniques to
generate narrative action sequences and animation. The authors translate Popp’s
characterization of folktale functions into narrative events, such as transgression,
deception, wedding, struggle, and punishment. These functions form primitives that
are used to construct sequences of events (p. 73), and provide a formalism for
narrative structure. The four primary points of Popp’s work are:
1.

Narrative functions are the basic primitives of folktales. They
are stable and invariant elements, independent from the
characters that execute them, and from the modalities of their
execution.
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2. There are a limited number of such functions, which form
the primitives.
3. Functions will always occur in the same order, although any
given folktale may use a proper subset.
4. The order does not allow backtracking.
Beyond this structure, Greimas (Cavazza M. and Pizzi, 2006, p. 74) built a
role-based analysis of narratives.

The concept of an actant, was added to define

characters. Actants were defined in pairs of oppositional characters, such as Subject
v. Object. With the addition of Greimas’ actants and Popp’s functions, we now have
the actions and characters required to build a story.
In (Brooks, 1996), the observation is made that stories tend to be written in a
linear fashion, and are perceived by the audience within the context of their cultural
experience. Stories tend to be told sequentially, with a beginning, middle, and end
state. However, they are not usually created sequentially. Authors start with an idea,
and may begin in the middle or at the end of the story. The finished product is
refined over several drafts; revised at the request of editors, directors, or producers;
and eventually goes to press, where the intended audience votes with their wallets on
the author’s success or failure. Figure 15 illustrates the sequential nature of story
production.
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Figure 15 – The traditional model of story creation.
The notion of computational narrative explores the customization of the
storytelling experience for each audience member. In a computational narrative
model, the audience actively participates in the navigation of the story. For example,
a game such as Adventure or Dungeon and Dragons takes different execution
branches depending on the user’s decisions. With a computational narrative model,
the story can be tailored to reflect each participant’s perceptions.
Kevin M. Brooks at the MIT Media Lab conducted one of the early
experiments in computational narrative (Brooks, 1996). Brooks decomposed a story
into 3 atomic components:
1. Events,
2. People, or characters, and
3. Things.
These three components are built into a narrative, which describes the organization of
information. A narration explains how the narrative is expressed to the intended
audience. For example, a movie may start as a narrative created by the screenwriter.
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As it moves through production, various other experts such as costumers, dialogue
coaches, and the director may alter the narrative over several iterations. The resulting
end product is the narration. Figure 16 illustrates the iterative nature of narration
creation.

Figure 16 – The actual way narrative is created.
Brooks believed that a story could connect the creator with the audience
through a computational model. In Brooks’ model, a narration was created through
four different processes:
1. The representation process – which defined the components of the story.
2. The presentation process - determining how the components are revealed to
the audience.
3. The reasoning process – which applies logical inferences about the
components based on the representation.
4. The reasoning engine – which coordinates the processes of reasoning,
representation, and presentation, and provides the results to the audience.
Through the use of behavior-based artificial intelligence, the reasoning engine in
Brooks’ model was capable of adapting either to the audience’s response or to the
creator’s manipulation of the elements, based on the inference engine’s recalculation
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of the story line. Figure 17 illustrates the computational narrative model of story
creation.

Figure 17. The creation of a narrative, computer generated.
Brooks further defined three components of a computational narrative:
1. The representational environment – which reasons about the world
presented in a given story.
2. The structural environment, or story framework – which provides the
basic story events, such as characters, conflicts, resolution, diversions, and
endings.
3. The presentation environment – which presents the results of the
interpretation of the story framework and the representation to the
audience, and delivers feedback to the artist for subsequent structure and
story manipulation.
The computational narrative model thus defined was applied as the basis for the
Agent Story environment, an early prototype for interaction between the creator and
the audience in storytelling environments.
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From the preliminary perspective provided by Brooks, research continued into how to
capture collaboration among authors and tell stories from alternative viewpoints.
Mazalek and Davenport have explored the use of interaction platforms to define the
structural environment and help the audience develop a frame of reference (Mazalek
A. and Davenport, G., 2003). With their colleague Ishii, Mazalek and Davenport
(Mazalek A. et al., 2003) developed a Tangible Viewpoints system to allow
collaborative authors to choose a story’s direction through the manipulation of pawnlike tokens on a game screen. With this model, the data is represented in 3dimensions, and the collaborators can maintain a frame of reference for each
character of interest (Mazalek A. et al., 2002). Case study experiments of how the
Tangible Viewpoints model works in actual collaborations are included in their work.
Zagalo and Szilas proposed refinements to the basic framework of a story. In
(Zalago, Barker, & Branco, 2004), emotion as a feedback mechanism is introduced,
and a feedback notation for detection, categorization, and intensity is feedback
provided by the story agents. Szilas looks at action as a narrative structure element
that augments the story framework as a refinement mechanism based on audience
interaction (Szilas, 2004).

SUMMARY
To conclude our review of the literature, we have a large and diverse set of
security policies that have formal models.

We have several policy authoring tools

that explore templates, constrained natural languages, and graphical authoring
environments.

Further, we have a collection of analytical tools to disassemble

narrative text and story elements into their basic components for textual analysis.

74

However, the policies discussed are highly formal, the policy authoring environments
constrain the user in syntax and expression, and the narrative analysis tools have not
been applied to security policies.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
This chapter describes the research methodology, the research methods to be
employed, development and validation of the experiment, results presentation, and
resources required to complete the experiment. Recall, the high-level goal is to
determine the feasibility of defining a top-level narrative-based security policy that
can (a) support a significant degree of formalism; (b) accommodate verification of
completeness and (c) traceability to lower-level functional system specifications.
The research objective is the definition of the logical security principles that comprise
the system security policy such that:
(a) they can govern system behavior,
(b) are enforceable throughout the system design process, and
(c) are comprehensible to the system stakeholders.
An end-user should never have to be concerned with the format of an access
control list or firewall rule: a general statement of access management should be
traceable to lower-level implementation specific constraints. Our hypothesis is that
the security policy elements required to implement complex security meta-policies
can be best expressed as story or narrative elements, which can be decomposed into
sub-policies and system requirements. The eventual result of such decomposition is
that the policy enforcement mechanisms can be explicitly traced back to the specific
story elements within the top-level policy statement.

Overview of the Research Methodology
There are few research methodologies that have been successfully applied to
the domain of security policy. Unlike traditional computational research, there are no
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performance measures associated with security policy. That is, one cannot say that a
given policy results in a faster solution N-percent of the time, or that one policy
requires more execution statements than another.

Therefore the research

methodology selected for this project is a qualitative research model, in particular a
grounded theory methodology as described by Creswell (2013).

Creswell

differentiates narrative studies as those creating a portrait of an individual (p. 122),
and ethnography as the study of a culture-sharing group on a large scale (p. 122).
Neither of these qualitative methodologies applies to security policy research.
Examination of most security policy research indicates an emphasis on formal proof
of a given security policy model (Bell D. , 1994) (Bell D. & LaPadula, L., 1976)
(Bertino, Ferrari, & Perlasca, 2001) (Gligor, 1995) (Lin, 2000). These models
essentially are logical case studies that emulate specific elements of behavior.
Phenomenology does not apply, as this research does not focus on the lived
experiences of individuals around a phenomenon, such as a war or a cultural
revolution (Cresswell, 2013).
This leaves the qualitative methodology of grounded theory. Our objective
was to generate a substantive theory and validate it through systematic procedures for
data collection, analysis and categorization, and specification of the context and
conditions under which the theory operated (p. 123).
Specific Research Method(s) to be Employed
Grounded theory methodology (GTM) is a systematic, qualitative procedure
to extract information (Chakraborty & Dehlinger, 2009).

GTM can be further

described as “a qualitative research method that uses a systematic set of procedures to
develop an inductively derived grounded theory about a phenomenon” (Strass &
Corbin, 1998). A worked example of the application of GTM to enterprise system
requirements is presented in Chakraborty & Dehlinger (p. 333), who apply GTM to:
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•
•
•
•

Present a structured, qualitative analysis method to identify
enterprise requirements
Provide a basis to verify enterprise requirements via high-level
enterprise architecture objectives
Allow for the representation of business strategy in a requirements
engineering context
Enable the traceability of enterprise architecture objectives in the
requirements engineering and design phases.

Figure 18 illustrates the coding phases of GTM in the context of
requirements engineering, as interpreted by Chakraborty & Dehlinger (p. 335).

Figure 18. Coding phases of GTM in the context of requirements engineering (p.
335).
Similarly, Lehmann (2010) discusses the application of GTM to Information
Systems, which are defined as action networks of technology and people. Lehmann
contends that GTM was originally created to uncover social theory from empirical
data generated across a broad spectrum of contexts and activities, and to create
theoretical foundations which were nonexistent (p.1). Indeed, GTM is defined as the
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discovery of theory from data – systematically obtained and analyzed in social
research (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Essentially, GTM is a simple research sequence:
“I gathered data and once the data was arranged in neat piles, I wrote them up”
(Stoller, 1987). The arrangement of the data, or its coding, are defined in three steps
in Miles and Huberman (Miles, 1994):
1. Commonalities in the data are captured in descriptive codes to
more clearly capture the essential attributes of the phenomenon;
2. As more data and codes are available, interpretive codes are
abstracted from the idiographic confines of the concrete incidents
to help understand what is going on behind the data;
3. Lastly, inferential pattern codes, now abstract of space and time
and etic to the substantive range of the research, are
conceptualized: they are explanatory and often predictive.
The important element of GTM is the analysis, not necessarily the data itself.
Strauss & Corbin (Strauss, 1990) state:
Concepts are the Basic Units of Analysis.
A theorist
works with conceptualizations of the data, not the actual data per
se. Theories can’t be built with actual incidents or activities as
observed or reported; that is, from “raw data.” The incidents,
events, and happenings are taken as, or analyzed as potential
indicators of phenomena, which are thereby given conceptual
labels… As the researcher encounters other incidents, and when
after comparison to the first, they appear to resemble the same
phenomena, then these, too, can be labeled (in the same way).
Only by comparing incidents and naming like phenomena with the
same term can a theorist accumulate the basic units for theory.
Figure 19 illustrates this cycle.

In GTM, samples are analyzed until all the

categorizations and properties are validated.
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Figure 19. The analysis cycle of GTM (Lehmann, p. 5).
Research Design
We applied GTM to the research questions posed in Chapter 1.

Using this

methodology, the workflow associated with the research is presented in Figure 20.
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Figure 20. Experiment Workflow
Identification of the elements of security policy and the elements of story have
been conducted as part of the preliminary research for this experiment. (Carnielli &
Pittarello, 2009) present a case study to validate story analysis against the plot of an
actual novel addressing the contextual data involved in an autobiograpical story.
They use the approach defined by (Segre & Kemeney, 1988) which defines four
levels of narrative analysis:
1. Discourse – the linguistic, stylistic, and metric features of the
text;
2. Story – the set of actions as they are presented to the reader by
the author;
3. Fabula – the set of actions logically and chronologically
ordered;
4. Narrative model—structure characterized by invariants
common to a set of texts.
Carnielli and Pittarello apply these levels to create a decision tree of “scenes”
that define the spatial elements of the physical environment. “Situations” are a set of
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actions the user may choose from that will trigger the next set of actions within the
story (p. 93).
We propose to apply the narrative structure of Segre and Kemeney in
conjunction with a story designed to elicit the policy elements required for RAdAC
access control decisions. Our objective is to capture the policy elements for use by
the risk decision element of the RAdAC model. Figure 21 illustrates the RAdAC
model, with the policy elements to be elicited highlighted.

Figure 21. RAdAC model, with policy elements highlighted.
Table 2 presents the definitions of these elements from (Government, Global
Information Grid Information Assurance Reference Capabilities Document, 2004 p.
3-15).
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Table 2. Risk Attributes of RAdAC Model
Attribute
Definition
Characteristics of people who create and Unique identifier, citizenship, security
consume information
clearance level, source, organization,
community of interest membership(s),
rank, length of service, job title, system
privileges, operational position
Characteristics of IT Components that Unique device identifier, operating
create information and enable people, system, hardware features, owning
applications, or services to create, share, organization,
network
connectivity,
or use information
location, certified system administrator,
current system certification
Characteristics of Soft objects such as Data, applications, services, identifier,
files or databases that are shared
sensitivity level, releasability, protection
quality, source, originator, intended usage
Physical location, adversarial threat level,
Environmental factors
operational need
National, enterprise wide, or local
Situational factors
indicators of a situational condition such
as the threat level associated with a
particular type of attack (cyber, terrorist,
nuclear)
Knowledge acquired from past sharing
Heuristics
and
access
decisions
such
as
characteristic profiles for all other
factors, plus weighting factor in the
overall access decision.
Identification of Complex Systems for Experimentation
The next step in the experimental process is the selection of complex system
architectures that can be subject to analysis. In the book Thinking in Systems,
Donella H. Meadows defines a system as “an interconnected set of elements that is
coherently organized in a way that achieves something….a system must consist of
three kinds of things: elements, interconnections, and a function or purpose” (2008,
p. 11). (Meadows, 2008) Complex systems apply various enforcement mechanisms
to enforce a comprehensive security policy. For example, a cloud-based system
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might employ firewalls, routers, directory services, and various application
mechanisms to enforce a security-as-a-service architecture.

For the purposes of this

set of experiments subject matter experts on the given system(s) and their policy
enforcement mechanisms must be accessible to the researcher.

This will support

validation of the story and the narrative requirements statements.

With the policy

attributes and story components identified, selection of the systems was the next
critical item in the process.

Three distinct system architectures were selected for

experimentation.
Architecture 1 is an enterprise mail infrastructure.

It supports a global

Fortune 500 company with over 15,000 mail clients deployed. This infrastructure is
used to support both internal and external electronic mail, and is directly connected to
the Internet. Figure 22 illustrates the enterprise mail infrastructure.

Figure 22. Representative enterprise e-mail architecture.
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Architecture 2 is a network infrastructure responsible for connecting over 15,000
individual sites for a mission critical systems control application.

In this

architecture, the network device health and status information is segregated from the
device data streams.

That is, information on the health of the network and its

connections is transmitted to a management node, while information used by the
network applications is transmitted to analytical nodes for processing and
visualization. Figure 23 illustrates this architecture.

Figure 23. Network Infrastructure Architecture for 14,000-site network topology.
The third system architecture is an enterprise services architecture that crosses
from a secure domain to an untrusted domain in a publish-subscribe model.
Architecture 3 reflects the circumstance where an information provider wishes to
make data products available to the public, but wants to make absolutely certain that
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the subscribers cannot “reach back” into the enterprise intranet and extract additional
unauthorized data. Figure 24 illustrates the system architecture for this system.

Figure 24. System architecture for one-way publish-subscribe message broker.
Identification of Data Inputs and Classification
Planned data inputs for the experiment consisted of:
1. The story narratives designed to address the attributes of risk adaptive
access control policies. Story narratives will be written with the
assistance of system subject matter experts. These subject matter experts
will review the security policy defined in the narrative to correct any
errors in policy statement.
2. A requirements specification addressing the attributes of risk adaptive
access control policies. Requirements statements will be written with the
assistance of system subject matter experts. These subject matter experts
will review the requirements statements to correct any omissions in the
policy requirements specification.
3. Comprehension questions developed to assess the reader’s understanding
of the policy.
To eliminate author bias, the questions will be
independently developed by a security subject matter expert with no
knowledge of the overall experiment.
4. Demographic questions for the experiment participants. These questions
will address age, computer system usage, general occupation, and years of
experience. The demographic questions are for classification purposes
only; they will not be used to identify the subjects by name.
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A trial experiment was conducted with a small group of cooperative subjects,
in these cases members of the local Information System Security Association (ISSA)
chapter. Using the planned data inputs proved problematic in a group setting; some
subjects simply decided to leave early, and chose not of participate. Others wanted
to debate potential responses as if the survey was a certification exam. Further, some
subjects got lost in reading a one page narrative and lost interest. This experience
led to adjustments to the original plan to facilitate data coding.
Finding a sufficiently sized group that would not be considered biased by
virtue of their employer made it simpler to conduct the survey online anonymously.
Anonymity of survey participants was protected by not asking for names and not
tracking IP addresses of participants.
A standard set of demographic questions was developed, to accommodate
analysis both on an aggregate experiment level and at the level of architecture
description, either narrative or requirements based.
A standard set of definitional questions was developed for the same reason,
and also facilitated a common understanding of the terminology.
Finally, instead of a single consolidated story narrative, a selection of brief,
one paragraph scenarios were used.

These were designed to accommodate a short

user attention span, and were matched with requirements specification language that
reflected approximately the same scenario.
This completed the inputs to the experiments, and provided the framework for
data categorization and subsequent analysis of the results.
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Sampling
To conduct the research involved, three distinct research samples were
developed.

These research samples are all purposeful (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2012).

The candidates selected are used to determine the cognitive value of using the
security policy story.

Three samples are employed, one for each of the complex

system architectures used as data inputs. The sample subjects were made familiar
with the same complex system architecture for each experiment.
Sampling Strategy
Sample personnel were originally planned to be the application user community
that relies upon the given complex system. These personnel are the end users of the
complex system architecture. To the sample personnel, the devices used to create the
actionable data displayed on their monitors are transparent. Sample participants met
the following basic criteria:
•

Have at least 1year of experience as an end user of the system.

•

Possess positions requiring use of the system on a daily basis.

Unfortunately, the communities of system users available for this experiment could
have potentially been biased by virtue of their employers.

In one of the scenarios,

the users could have been the organization that operates the system. In another, the
sample population would have been consumers of the system. To avoid these biases,
an adjustment was made to the original plan: instead of using known populations, a
more random population of subjects was solicited.

The survey instrument was made

available in two Linked In user communities: The CyberWarfare User Community
and the DIACAP/FISMA/5800.2 authorization and approval community.

These

communities were selected because they have large membership populations (over
1,000 members each) and are fairly active (usually 5-10 different message threads
have posts daily).
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Research Design
The research was designed as a series of three experiments, one that matches
each of the complex system architectures identified as data inputs to the research.
Each experiment followed the same experiment protocol.
Preliminary Trial
Prior to conducting the three experiments, a preliminary trial was conducted
with a smaller sample set of subjects.

The purpose of the preliminary trial is to

ensure the directions are clear and that the subjects are not confused by the
instructions or the questions.

The preliminary trial used a simple architecture of a

print server on a local area network segment. Only authorized users within a given
range of office space are allowed to print on the print server. The preliminary trial
was expected to find and resolve any ambiguities in the questions and the instructions
prior to initiating the complex architecture experiments.

As was discussed above,

several areas of the experiment were refined as a result of lessons learned during the
preliminary trial.
Experiment 1 – Enterprise Messaging Architecture
Knowledge Workers/Participants
Participants in the study were a group of 50 Information Technology Users.
This number of users is consistent with the sample size used in (Carnielli, 2009),
which used a single sample of 35 users for one experiment.

These engineers were

recruited via announcement in the Linked In communities.

The surveys were

created in SurveyMonkey™, a survey design and analysis environment that allows
creation of multiple choice and short completion surveys and provides a hosting
platform for population surveys as services based computing application.
The subjects may have security policy implementation knowledge, but
probably have not derived an information security policy.
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That is, if required, the

security policy to be implemented in their normal job function is one that has been
provided to them.

For example, they have implemented specific firewall rules, but

have not had to derive the rules from network traffic analysis. The participants may
have been responsible for device security configuration, which includes applying
vendor patches, vulnerability scanning on a routine basis, and password management
of administrative accounts.
Experiment Design
Experiment participants were provided with one of the two narratives: either
a story-based security narrative or a requirements specification narrative.
narratives reflected the same system architecture.
the narrative, and then take a brief survey.

Both

The subjects were asked to read

The survey consisted of demographic

questions to facilitate subject classification, definitional questions to ensure a
common understanding, and security policy questions developed to test their
comprehension of the policy narrative.
Training
The study participants did not require training. The questions answered after
reading the narrative were multiple choice categorizations or brief answer, similar to
the questions asked in a traditional marketing survey or academic testing
environment.
After the data collection session, the results from the experiment were
analyzed.

The two groups (requirements specification and story narrative) were

compared to determine which narrative provided a more understandable (or
memorable) security policy statement.
Experiments 2 and 3
Experiments 2 and 3 were conducted in the same fashion as Experiment 1.
The difference is that these experiments were conducted with different complex
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system architectures.

By varying the system architectures applied to the

experiments, any existing knowledge bias should have been eliminated because it is
highly unlikely that the same subject sample would have prior knowledge of all three
architectures.

Sample sizes were identical for each experiment, and were divided

between the requirements specification narrative and the story narrative.
Instrument Development and Validation
There were 6 experimental instruments developed. All instruments shared a
common set of demographic and definitional questions, designed to facilitate coding
of the populations.

Each of the three system architectures required two system

descriptions, one in narrative format and one in requirements specification format.
Each system architecture was tested against a 50 subject population group,
with 25 participants receiving the narrative and 25 participants receiving the
requirements specification language.

The original plan was to randomly select

subjects for each group until the population was full, and then begin populating the
next system architecture.
of connected surveys.

Unfortunately, Survey Monkey does not permit the notion
The experimenter had to monitor the response count, and

change the survey link manually when the maximum subject threshold was reached
for a given instrument.
Formats for Presenting Results
Results from the experiments were subject to categorization and open coding
of results.

Initial coding applied demographic information gathered from the

participants to determine correlations between the participant’s level of expertise and
the accuracy of the resulting narrative.

The initial code rubric was a simple matrix

of the number of iterations and the types (minor/major) of clarifications required as a
result of the iteration.
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The 3 experiments were executed with 50 people each, divided into 2 groups
per experiment, for a total sample size of 150 participants.

Results from the

preliminary trial were not included in the experimental analysis.
Aggregate results of the experiment are presented as trending analysis data
and summary tabular information in Section 4. Best presentation mechanisms were
determined as the results and experiments were refined throughout the analytical
process.
RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
The resources required to complete this experiment are minimal: a single
personal computer for data preparation and result correlation. Items to be prepared
include the data collection forms, the requirements narrative and the story narrative.
Data collection forms were created using Microsoft Word and transferred to the
Survey Monkey℠ platform to generate the survey instrument. The requirements
specification narrative was created using traditional specification language samples
such as those provided in NIST 800-53 (NIST, 2013).

The story was created with

Microsoft Word, after experimentation with Inspiration, an author’s outlining toolkit,
or the Writer’s Dream Kit, an alternative story development environment. Ultimately
the story creation environment was a function of personal preference. Someone less
familiar with requirements definition and narrative might have been perfectly happy
using Inspiration or the Writer’s Dream Kit.

All of these tools were accessible to the

experiment designer.
SUMMARY
In conclusion, the experimental discussion has presented an overview of the
issues associated with security policy specification and logical correspondence.
Given that security policies have become more expressive with additional constraints
and rule-based capabilities, reaching the eventual binary access control decision has
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become a more complex task.

Additionally, the need to provide dynamic security

policies in the event of cyber attack scenarios means policy modifications must be
rapidly propagated throughout an infrastructure. This does not leave time to resolve
security policy conflicts when an entire mission critical network may be
compromised.
We present an alternative approach, specifying security policy through
storytelling.

Stories provoke discussion, help our collective memory recall the

success or failure of past policy attempts, and encourage alternative solutions.

As

security policies become more robust in their emulation of the “real world, “ it will
become more difficult to prove logical soundness with existing formal methods.
Given that the ability to perform natural language processing is improving, it may be
more feasible to perform policy analysis through the use of narratology. The use of
computer-assisted narrative for policy management is an area that has not been
explored to date.
Further research in ontologies and natural language authoring environments
needs to be conducted to determine if policies can be expressed and analyzed with
these capabilities.

Mankind shares a common social history in story; our cultural

differences change the context.

As our social media converges in the global

communications network, it will be interesting to determine if our stories and our
policies converge as well.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
This chapter presents the data analysis and research results of the experiment.
Recall, from Chapter 3, the objective of our experiment was to prove our hypothesis,
that the security policy elements required to implement complex security metapolicies can be best expressed as story or narrative elements, which can be
decomposed into sub-policies and system requirements. We have chosen to use the
Grounded Theory Methodology (GTM) to validate the hypothesis, and designed our
experiment to collect data to further facilitate our information coding.

Bloomberg

and Volpe (2012) illustrate the data analysis process in Figure 24 (p. 140).

Figure 25 The Qualitative Data Analysis Process mapped to data transformations and
dissertation chapters.
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Data Analysis
Strauss and Corbin

(Strauss, 1990) have identified seven criteria as a

guideline to determine the quality of a grounded theory study. The applicability of
the criteria to the data analysis is presented in the following sections.
Criterion Number One: how was the original sample selected?
The original sample was selected from local security practitioners in the Melbourne,
Florida area.

However, the consideration of sample bias was raised because most of

the practitioners work for a single employer.
sample was selected.

To mitigate this bias, an alternate

Linked In℠ is a popular professional social networking site

that supports the notion of communities of interest.

A notice was posted in two of

these communities of interest: the Cyber Warfare Community of Interest and the
DIACAP/FISMA/FEDRAMP Authorization and Approval Community of Interest.
These groups were used because they are large communities of users, with over 1000
users each. The notice is illustrated in Figure 25.
Call for participation:
A graduate student at Nova Southeastern University is conducting a survey on access
control policy specification. Participation consists of answering survey questions.
The survey will take no more than 25 minutes of your time for all portions of the
survey. All responses are anonymous. If you have any questions or concerns,
please contact hronda@nova.edu. Please click on the following link to participate in
this research project: www.surveymonkey.com/XYZ
Figure 26. Participation Solicitation Notice.
The criteria for sample selection were straightforward: if a candidate clicked on the
survey and provided consent the candidate was added to the sample. When a given
survey was full, the solicitation was modified to reflect the next sample group, until
the full 150-subject sample was completed.
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The candidates were purely random and

anonymous.

The only common element was that they were members of the

appropriate community of interest.
Criterion Number Two: What major categories emerged?
The major categories had begun emerging in the literature survey, particularly
in the discussions of security policy and computer assisted storytelling.

From the

various security policy formalisms, the notion of subjects, objects, and actions has
become an accepted standard practice.

That is, subjects are uniquely identified

users or processes acting on the behalf of user.

Objects are data files, or containers,

that reflect computing resources available to the user.

Actions are explicit acts, or

instructions, that are conducted upon data containers, such as read, write, copy, and
delete operations.
From the computer assisted storytelling realm, the concept of principal actors,
actions, and catalysts emerged.
characters in a story.

Principal actors can be considered the primary

Actions become the activities the principal actor engages in

over the course of the story, and catalysts become the motivating factors that modify
the activities.

For example, in Miguel Cervantes’ Don Quixote, the Don is the

primary character, and he engages in a series of somewhat misguided quests over the
course of the story. Finally, at the end of the story, the Don has the revelation that
his actions have been misguided, and his actions are altered to reflect this change in
perception.
These major categories were applied to the creation of the survey instrument.
For clarity, the instrument was divided into a definitional component and a situational
component.

The definitional component was identical for both the narrative and the
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requirements-based situational components.

This was a refinement from the trial

administration, where the experiment subjects raised explicit questions about
contextual information and environmental dependencies.
Given that the comprehensive set of security controls in NIST 5800.4 (U.S.
Government, 2013) is well over 250 pages of text, a single family of security controls
was used as the basis for the survey instrument, the family of access control.

This

selection was made to align with the initial coding of security policy models and
computational narrative constructs.

A comprehensive survey instrument that

addressed the entire family of access control requirements would have been
prohibitively long for a voluntary participation survey.

Further, creation of a

narrative scenario would have become a small novel, challenging the subject’s
reading comprehension and attention span.
The thought of asking the subject to create a “security story” was also
considered, but was discarded.

While the human brain is wired to accept narrative

information, it is not a universal talent to create and tell a story.

Rather than bias the

study with the possibility of bad prose from subjects who could not write, or force the
subject to use unfamiliar authoring environments, the experiment became a
comparative assessment of comprehension between a traditional requirements
specification and small security vignettes.
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Criterion 3:

What were some of the events, incidents, actions and so on, (as

indicators) that pointed to some of these major categories?
The major categories of coding were extracted primarily from categorizations
that were made within the context of security policies (subjects, objects, actions) and
the context of narrative components (characters, circumstances, actions).

In the

domain of security policies, earlier policy models were limited to <subject, object,
action> triples.

Over time, subjects and objects were further refined with specific

security-relevant attributes. For example, classification of the data container and the
clearance of the subject were the earliest security relevant attributes incorporated into
the security policy domain (Bell, D. & LaPadula, L. 1976).

The most robust model

defined to date is that of risk-adaptive access control (RaDAC) (McGraw, 2004),
where various attributes affect the security policy and the user’s access is modified
based on the values of these attributes. For example: a user’s access may depend on
the time of day, which type of device is being used, and where a user is located.
Data that can be accessed when the user is on the corporate campus may not be
accessible from a smart phone or tablet device when the user is on an airplane.

This

evolutionary refinement of the respective disciplines influenced the coding of data as
the study progressed.

98

Criterion 4:

On the basis of what categories did theoretical sampling

proceed? Guide data collection? Was it representative of the categories?
Theoretical sampling was guided by three distinct requirements:
1. A need to collect demographic information about the survey respondents, to
allow categorization of the sample.
2. A need to establish common definitional terms, or to at least provide
respondents the opportunity to agree or disagree with the terminology applied
in the study.
3. A need to support comparative analysis of narrative discourse and
requirements specification.
These requirements influenced the data collection process, in that they shaped the
data questionnaires as defined in Appendices C-J.

The author defined the use of a

narrative discourse or a requirements specification as the independent variable of the
experiment, as it was the only section of the questionnaire that was not identical
across all populations.
Criterion 5: What were some of the hypotheses pertaining to conceptual relations
(that is, among categories) and on what grounds were they formulated and tested?
At the highest level, our hypothesis was that it was feasible to define a toplevel narrative-based security policy that can (a) support a significant degree of
formalism; (b) accommodate verification of completeness and (c) traceability to
lower-level functional system specifications. The research objective is the definition
of the logical security principles that comprise the system security policy such that:

99

(a) they can govern system behavior,
(b) are enforceable throughout the system design process,
(c) and are comprehensible to the system stakeholders.
Security policy research has usually been based upon the ability to
accommodate verification of completeness and traceability to low-level functional
system specifications through the use of formal methods and logical proof (Bell, D.
E., 2005).

Unfortunately, most users of computer systems do not have degrees in

formal logic, and have not proven a theorem since high school geometry.

To

facilitate logical correctness, the author hypothesized that a grammatically sound
English sentence could be used to communicate the concepts of subjects, objects,
actions, and attributes to the end user. In many systems today, the end user is left to
their own devices when establishing a security policy for an application or a given
device.

For example, Internet access to private residences does not come with

caveats to enable wireless access protection through encryption, thereby allowing the
entire neighborhood to piggyback on a single user’s connection. Personal computers
brought the Defense Information System Network (DISN) to its knees when military
personnel brought work home on USB drives and unknowingly brought malicious
code back to the office on Monday morning.
Our data collection activities addressed these issues by comparing the
requirements defined in traditional requirements specifications with narrative
discourse designed to present scenarios where access could be granted or denied.
The objective was to explain the policy implementation within the context of
everyday communication and language, not within the confines of symbolic logic and
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set theory mathematics.

Oftentimes the only way to extract policy rules for a

complex system is to define usage scenarios, present them to the user community, and
hope for consensus on the resulting behavior.
Criterion 6: Were there instances when hypotheses did not hold up against what was
actually seen?
In a perfect world, the state of the art in all research areas for an
interdisciplinary study such as this one would be sufficiently mature to accommodate
the hypotheses at hand.

Unfortunately, the world is not perfect.

While we can

express security policy in terms of subjects, objections, actions, and attributes, we
cannot have both formalism and functional information systems.

While some

improvement in theorem proving technology has been made over the last 20 years,
the feasibility of proving code bases of over 1 million lines of code is still beyond the
state of the art.
Similarly, computer-assisted storytelling is very much in its infancy.

While

the research community understands the components of a story-telling computer, our
ability to develop an ontology accommodating the vast nature of human language is
somewhat lacking.

There have been attempts to apply neuroscience to understand

how a human catalogs experiences and develops comprehension, but the ability to
accurately measure and monitor these capabilities is just emerging into the
mainstream research community.

The computer-generated stories of today are of

the “See Spot. See Spot run.” variety: simplistic and lacking the rich contextual
background that should accommodate concepts such as RaDAC. When these areas
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were discovered in the course of the research, they were noted and documented in this
dissertation.
Criterion 7: How and why was the core category selected (sudden, gradual, difficult,
easy)? On what grounds?
The core category of this research was selected gradually, over time, and with
some difficulty. Conceptually, the notion of a security policy being understandable is
quite simple. Our society has standards for sharing, and not sharing, information that
have not quite become as soundly established in the realm of cyberspace.
Understanding the sociological basis of story and how the human brain is designed to
comprehend narrative story was an emerging interdisciplinary process.

Defining

security policy in the context of storytelling became less complex when the
categorizations of story structure and components were aligned with the structure of
security policy.
Findings
Bloomberg and Volpe (2012) state:
You, the researcher, are the storyteller. Your goal is to tell a story
that should be vivid and interesting while accurate and credible. In your
report, the events, the people, and their words and actions are made explicit
so the reader can experience the situation as real in a similar way to the
researcher and experience the world of the participants. (p 148)
To that end, the population for this study was drawn from two LinkedIn℠
communities of interest: the CyberWarfare community and the
DIACAP/FISMA/FEDRAMP community. Both of these communities have large
subscriber bases of active practitioners in the field of cyber security. The
demographics of the survey population can be found in Appendix K.
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For the

purposes of this study, there was no statistically significant difference among the
subjects’ basic background that would skew the results relative to interpretation of a
requirements based system specification or a story-based specification.
From a demographic perspective, the average survey respondent has been
working in the security field from 8-10 years, has at least a Bachelor’s degree, and
works in civil government, technology, or the aerospace industry.

Forty percent (60

of the 150 respondents) hold at least one security certification, the most common
being the Certified Information System Security Professional (CISSP). Twenty
percent of the respondents are involved in system authorization and approval. Given
the Federal Government’s tiered model of certifications and years of experience
acceptable for various career levels, these demographics are not remarkable.
Part Two of the survey provided definitional context to address security policy
definitions.

These five questions were designed to eliminate ambiguity in the

context of access control.

Subjects were asked to agree or disagree with the

definition, and provided the opportunity to comment on their answers. Prior to the
first question, the questions were caveated with the following paragraph:
“There are several types of access controls that can be used in cyberspace. We are
not concerned with physical access controls for this research project, but with access
controls in information systems.” This caveat was incorporated into the survey to
make it clear that the research was not about physical access management to a
computer facility or data center, but about the access management that occurs within
a computer system.
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In general, the subject population agreed with the definitions as written.

This

is not surprising, since the terms and their definitions came from known, generally
accepted glossaries of terminology such as the NIST Information Assurance
Glossary. The percentage of each population group that agreed or disagreed with the
respective definitions is illustrated in Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7
Table 3. Definitional Question Results: Discretionary Access Control
Discretionary Access Control is a type of access control that restricts access to objects based on the
identity of the subjects or groups to which the subjects belong. The access controls are discretionary
because subjects with certain privileges are capable of passing those privileges to any other subjects,
either directly or indirectly. Do you agree or disagree with this definition? If you disagree, please
comment.	
  

Percentage of Respondents Replying
Arch. 1–R

Arch. 1-N

Arch. 2-R

Arch. 2-N

Arch.3-N

Arch.3-R

Agree

75

80

80

85

85

90

Disagree

25

20

20

15

15

10

Those that disagreed with the definition of discretionary access control commented
about restricting access to objects based on the user’s identity, given that the
definition did not specify a unique user identity.

Another comment was that “certain

privileges” was ambiguous, especially if those privileges allowed the passing of
access rights to others.

An example was given of passing access to a member of a

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) country, in that granting access to one
country member of NATO usually means the entire Allied Forces would have access
by the next day. Those that disagreed wanted a more explicit definition of the term
to avoid ambiguity.
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Table 4 presents the results of the definitional question about execution
domains.

As defined in the NIST Information Assurance Glossary, a domain is the

cross product of the resources and users defined by the system security policy.

For

example, a trusted domain can be defined as the domain of intranet users, and an
untrusted domain would be the set of extranet users. The trusted domain is defined
by the access control boundary of an organization, for example, a firewall that is at
the intranet/extranet boundary.
Table 4. Definitional Question Results: Domain
A domain is an environment or context that includes a set of system resources and a set of system
entities that have the right to access the resources as defined by a common security policy, security
model, or security architecture. Do you agree or disagree with this definition? If you disagree, please
comment.

Percentage of Respondents Replying
Arch. 1–R

Arch. 1-N

Arch. 2-R

Arch. 2-N

Arch.3-N

Arch.3-R

Agree

80

75

85

90

85

95

Disagree

20

25

15

10

15

5

Again, there was general agreement on the domain definition. There was some
disagreement on the use of security policy or security model as the boundary
definition; in that the terminology was not as explicitly specified as it would be in a
security architecture. This would be a case where the subject may have been seeking
less ambiguity in the definition, in which case the lower level of abstraction would be
preferred.
Table 5 presents the results from the definitional question of Role-Based
Access Control (RBAC). This question generated the greatest consensus, with over
ninety percent of the respondents agreeing with the definition as stated.
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A large

percentage of the subject population is employed in the government and/or
technology fields, where RBAC is widely used to facilitate system administration
activities.

Table 5. Definitional Question Results: Role Based Access Control
Access control based on user roles (i.e., a collection of access authorizations a user receives based on
an implicit or explicit assumption of a given role). Role permissions may be inherited through a role
hierarchy and typically reflect the permissions needed to perform defined functions within an
organization. A given role may apply to a single individual or to several individuals. Do you agree or
disagree with this definition? If you disagree, please comment.

Percentage of Respondents Replying
Arch. 1–R

Arch. 1-N

Arch. 2-R

Arch. 2-N

Arch.3-N

Arch.3-R

Agree

90

95

85

90

95

95

Disagree

10

5

15

10

5

5

Table 6 summarizes the definitional question on the term security policy
model. This question generated the greatest disagreement percentages among the
participants. Comments received on this definition were that the subject did not
understand flow control, and that “other aspects of information security policy”
should have been explicitly stated. The author believes the issue may be that a
security policy model is usually an early system design artifact, and that several
system architectures essentially reuse existing security policy models. Tailoring of
abstract security policy models such as the Bell-LaPadula Model (Bell, D. &
LaPadula, L., 1976) is considered a detailed design activity at a lower level of
abstraction.
An alternative explanation may be found in the interpretation of the
demographics of the population.

Approximately 15 percent of the population
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characterized itself as a security architect; another 15 percent consider themselves
security engineers. That means 30 percent of the population routinely address
system design and requirements as part of their assigned duties. The remaining
population functions as security analysts, security operations personnel, and system
administrators. In these job categories, the employee is responsible for the actual
implementation of the security policy on given devices, such as firewalls, routers, and
servers, or is responsible for locating policy breaches and reverse engineering these
activities. As such, they are not usually concerned with the soundness of the policy
model, but with the enforcement of the model as translated through the design
abstractions.
Table 6. Definitional Question Results: Security Policy Model
An abstraction representing the basic properties or characteristics of an entity with respect to
safeguarding information; typically associated with internal data structures (e.g., records, buffers,
files), within the information system and used to enable the implementation of access control and flow
control policies, reflect special dissemination, handling, or distribution instructions, or support other
aspects of the information security policy. Do you agree or disagree with this definition? If you
disagree, please comment.

Percentage of Respondents Replying
Arch. 1–R

Arch. 1-N

Arch. 2-R

Arch. 2-N

Arch.3-N

Arch.3-R

Yes

70

75

65

70

80

75

No

30

25

35

30

20

25

Table 7 summarizes the findings on Mandatory Access Controls. There was minimal
disagreement on the definition of mandatory or non-discretionary access controls.
Comments made by the survey subjects asked for more explicit definitions of an
authorized user and/or what was considered an access control. For example, if a user
fails an identification and authentication challenge, this could be considered a form of
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mandatory access control, in that the system would not necessarily allow the user to
perform an activity. The example was provided of Amazon allowing anyone to
browse the on-line store, but only an authenticated user being allowed to purchase
merchandise.
Table 7. Definitional Question Results: Mandatory Access Control
Mandatory Access Controls or Non-discretionary access controls are access controls imposed by the
information system that cannot be altered without explicit action from an authorized user. Do you
agree or disagree with this definition? If you disagree, please comment.

Percentage of Respondents Replying
Arch. 1–R

Arch. 1-N

Arch. 2-R

Arch. 2-N

Arch.3-N

Arch.3-R

Agree

85	
  

80	
  

90	
  

90	
  

85	
  

80	
  

Disagree

15	
  

20	
  

10	
  

10	
  

15	
  

20	
  

As in the definitional results presented in Table 6, the results for Table 7 may have
more to do with the job functions of the respondents than their understanding of the
terms.

Operators and administrators do not usually think about policy as mandatory

or discretionary; policy is policy and is enforced by the system.

Especially at the

less experienced career levels, the security policy is mostly an abstraction, a design
concept and definition that is memorized for industry certification exams.

There is

very little thought about policy until one is asked to derive a policy based upon the
documentation provided by a client, which in most organizations is an activity
conducted by a security architect or a system security engineer.
Narrative v. Requirements Specification
The third and final section of the survey instrument addresses the question of
traditional requirements specification language compared to narrative requirements.
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For the purposes of comparison, Table 8 presents the two sets of specifications for
Architecture 1 in their entirety side by side.
Table 8. Architecture 1, Requirements Specification v. Narrative Language
Requirements Specification Language

Narrative Language

System Description:

System Description:

For the next set of questions, the system
is defined as an enterprise mail
infrastructure. It supports a global
Fortune 500 company with over 15,000
mail clients deployed. This infrastructure
is used to support both internal and
external electronic mail, and is directly
connected to the Internet. For this
discussion, we are only concerned about
the access control policy. The system in
question is implementing a new type of
access control, risk adaptive access
control, which considers the context of
the system environment to make access
control decisions.

For the next set of questions, the system
is defined as an enterprise mail
infrastructure. It supports a global
Fortune 500 company with over 15,000
mail clients deployed. This infrastructure
is used to support both internal and
external electronic mail, and is directly
connected to the Internet. For this
discussion, we are only concerned about
the access control policy. The system in
question is implementing a new type of
access control, risk adaptive access
control, which considers the context of
the system environment to make access
control decisions.

To send mail, a user shall be a registered
user in the enterprise.
A registered user shall be defined as a
user with a unique identity.
A registered user shall authenticate to the
system with an authentication token.
A mailbox shall be created for all
registered users of the messaging system.
The system shall allow for a maximum
mailbox size of 200 MB.
A warning message shall be generated if
the mailbox size exceeds 150 MB.
When the maximum mailbox size is
reached, a user shall not be allowed to
send messages until the mailbox size is
reduced.
Approval from the Messaging System
Administrator shall be required to extend
the maximum mailbox size beyond 200
MB.

To send mail, a user must be registered in
the enterprise, and have a unique user
identity and authentication token as well
as a mailbox. This is the nondiscretionary access control policy of the
messaging system.
When a user joins the company, he is
issued a unique user account and an
authentication token so he can access the
company systems. A mailbox is also
created for him. When a user leaves the
company, the user account is disabled,
but the mailbox remains active. A
maximum mailbox size is set, and if a
user exceeds it, they cannot send or
receive mail. Administrative assistants
can send mail on the behalf of managers
if they have been granted that privilege.
A department manager travels a lot and
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A user shall not send mail on the behalf
of another user.
A user can function in an administrative
role and send mail on the behalf of
another user provided the administrative
role is bound to both messaging system
users.
Messages sent on the behalf of a user
shall also be sent to the users normally in
this role, as well as the intended
recipient.
The system shall deliver a message
within 15 minutes of the user hitting
“send.”
If the system cannot deliver a message, a
notice of non-delivery shall be sent to the
user, with an explanation of why the
message was not delivered.

has his administrative assistant read and
respond to his routine email so he doesn’t
have to worry about them while he is on
the road. The administrator always sends
a copy of the message to the boss so he
knows what the message response was.
The administrative assistant cannot delete
messages from the manager’s account.

Note that in general, the same basic information is conveyed in both variants.
In the traditional requirements specification language, more specificity about sizes of
mailbox and delivery times is provided. In the narrative specification, the
requirements are less specific, and focus more on the rationale behind the policy, such
as a manager is on the road and his administrative assistant deals with routine
correspondence.
For the purpose of analysis, the questions were divided into smaller segments.
Segment one addressed the basic access control policy, and whether it was sufficient.
In the case of the traditional requirements specification subjects, 70 percent of the
respondents did not consider the requirements to be a minimum sufficient set of
access controls. The respondents wanted more specificity: how a user was
registered into the system, what qualified as a unique identity, what was an acceptable
authentication token, and when a user was considered registered.
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In contrast, 65

percent of the narrative respondents believed the set of requirements was minimally
sufficient. The 35 percent that did not consider the requirements to be sufficient
echoed the comments of the narrative respondents in that more specificity was
required.
The requirements specification discussion on maximum size of mailbox
(Question 14 in the survey) was considered a valid set of requirements for a
messaging system. Some commented on the inclusion of a role based access control
mechanism incorporated into this question, in that approval from the Messaging
System Administrator was required if the maximum mailbox size needed to be
increased. In the narrative specification, the majority of respondents considered the
narrative a sufficient set of access control requirements.
Questions 15, 16, and 17 were considered control questions. The same
question was asked in both versions of the survey instrument.

Question 15 resulted

in 80 percent of respondents selecting the answer “no messages can be sent or
received.” This is the correct response based upon the information presented.
Question 16 asks how many messages are sent when the administrative assistant
sends a message for the department manager.

The information provided indicates a

correct answer is two, one to the recipient and one to the department manager. In
reality, 35 percent of the respondents selected the answer that three messages were
sent, citing the retention of a message in the administrative assistants’ sent items
mailbox. It should be noted that not all mail systems maintain a sent items mailbox.
The last question in this survey posed an interesting challenge to the
respondents: “A user leaves the organization. Can the user still send email?” 85
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percent of the narrative respondents said the user could not send email, because the
user would not be registered within the enterprise. The requirements specification
respondents did not agree, and 50 percent found the question ambiguous.

The user

could still send email, simply not from that email system within the enterprise.
There were no restrictions on his ability to send email from alternative accounts, such
as a personal email account.
The second survey architecture represents a network infrastructure, a
considerably more complex system architecture example. While most system users
are quite familiar with electronic mail, fewer understand how network infrastructure
delivers packets, and how many defensive mechanisms are employed to reduce the
probability of a successful attack. Table 9 presents the alternate specifications.
Table 9: Alternate Specifications, Network Infrastructure
Requirements Specification

Narrative Specification

For the next section, the system in
question is a network infrastructure. The
network infrastructure is responsible for
connecting over 15,000 individual sites
for a mission critical system control
application. The network terminates at
the service delivery point, which is
similar to the cable service provider
termination at a personal residence.
Network device health and status
information shall be segregated from the
user data within the network.
The network and security management
node shall enforce the concept of least
privilege.
Two man control (security and network
administrators) shall be required to add a
component to the infrastructure: no one
person can completely register a device
on the network and configure it.

For the next section, the system in
question is a network infrastructure. The
network infrastructure is responsible for
connecting over 15,000 individual sites
for a mission critical system control
application. In this architecture, the
network device health and status
information is segregated from the device
data streams. That is, information on the
health and status of the network is
transmitted to a management node, while
information used by the network
applications is transmitted to analytical
nodes for processing and visualization.
The management node enforces least
privilege and two man controls on the
infrastructure components; no one person
can completely register a device on the
network and configure it. The networks
terminate at service delivery points
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(SDPs) that are not necessarily end user
servers or workstations.
For this set of analysis, the emphasis was on the notion of two-man control
and separation of duty policies. When a security administrator calls in sick, there is
only one administrator working, a network administrator. The question is raised as
to whether the network administrator can completely configure a device and place it
in operation.

The majority (70%) of respondents said the answer was NO in both

the narrative and the requirements specification survey instruments.

When the YES

answer was provided, it was expressed as a special circumstance, such as a device in
need of repair or replacement on an emergency basis.

It was not a question of

whether or not the network administrator had the knowledge, it was a question of did
the network administrator have the permissions to configure the security functions of
the device. Upon further analysis, these respondents were almost exclusively security
operations personnel, those who are responsible for the daily maintenance of a
system. In these cases, actual experience outweighed the statement of security
policy.
The next two questions in this survey focused on actual duties performed. In
both surveys, 65% of the respondents correctly categorized job functions.

Network

routing tables are normally considered part of network administration duties, and
audit log monitoring is part of security administration duties. Those who selected
minority answers (that audit logs are part of network administration duties and
routing table establishment is part of security administration duties) made those
selections based on their individual experiences. There are systems where security
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auditing is not implemented, but OpenFlow traffic monitoring is used to manage
network bandwidth. Additionally, there are networks where routing tables are
considered sensitive information; therefore routing table management could be
considered a security administration function. Again, it is more an environmentally
based answer than an answer that has its basis in written policy.
Finally, the question of patch management is presented in the final question
on this survey instrument.

The simple statement “Vulnerability remediation (patch

management) fixes vulnerabilities in the infrastructure” is presented.
asked to determine which job function is the best fit for this duty.

The subject is

Of the

requirements specification respondents, 70 percent placed vulnerability remediation
as a security function.

Narrative respondents were less definitive, with 50%

commenting that the function could be a network administration function, depending
upon the vulnerability in question.

One could state that the narrative respondents

took a more collaborative approach to the task than a strict separation of duty model
would indicate.
Finally, we examine the third architecture, a service-oriented architecture with
a content creator/content subscriber model that crosses a trusted boundary. The two
system specifications are presented in Table 10.
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Table 10. – Alternate Specifications, Publish Subscribe Model.
Requirements Specification

Narrative Specification

For the next set of questions, the system
shall support a content creator/content
subscriber model. All content created
within an enterprise shall be stored in a
data repository. When new content is
available, the subscriber shall be notified.
The information broker validates
information flow as illustrated in Figure
23.

For the next set of questions, the system
is defined as a content creator/content
subscriber model. All content is created
within an enterprise and stored in a data
repository. When new content is
available, subscribers are notified. The
information broker validates that the
subscriber is within the enterprise, or an
external subscriber.
If the subscriber is an external subscriber,
the information is pushed through a
firewall and made available on an
outwardly facing message bus. No
information is passed back through the
firewall to the internal message bus. An
external subscriber can collect
information from the external message
bus only, and cannot alter the original
content of the internal message bus

Architecture Three provides the highest degree of complexity, in that there is
cross-domain information flow between trusted and untrusted subscribers.

In the

constraints of this study, the respondents that received the requirements specification
form picked more constrained responses. For example, when asked how many types
of subscribers existed, 85 percent of requirements specification respondents picked
two: trusted and untrusted.

Of the narrative respondents, there were a higher

percentage of unknown responses, 45 percent.

The comments were that there was

not information to determine the types of subscribers, and that more information was
needed about the content to determine the subscriber type.
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The remaining questions had a distinct and similar pattern: the majority of
narrative respondents (averaging 80% over the four questions) were able to select
answers to the questions consistent with the security policy described in the narrative.
One could state that these respondents had the benefit of additional narration that was
not provided to the requirements specification respondents.

Alternatively, the

requirements specification respondents had the benefit of a system diagram
illustrating information flow across the domains.

With the information provided, it

would appear that the narrative specification respondents were able to more precisely
place the system security policy within the context of prohibited/allowed user
behaviors than a system diagram would allow.
Summary
In this section, we have discussed the criterion of a grounded theory
methodology experiment, and illustrated how this experiment conforms to the criteria
described in (Glaser & Strauss, 1968). The experiment is not a strict interpretation of
grounded theory methodology, which, in the constructs of Bloomberg and Volpe
(2012) , involve small populations, repeated interviews, and shared experiences
among the population.

Using this strict interpretation of qualitative experiment

design would have minimized the population size, and sacrificed anonymity of the
user population. It also would have proven manpower intensive to perform one-onone interviews with 150 experimental subjects.
The initial experimental objective, that narrative could be applied more
effectively as a requirements language than traditional specification language was
successfully illustrated: as the systems became more complex the narrative
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specifications appeared to deliver a more precise model of system behavior as defined
in the narrative specification and derived from the question responses.

The use of an

anonymous survey as a measuring instrument may lack a preferred depth of data in
that subjects are not interviewed; the survey does provide sufficient contextual
information to infer correct user behaviors from the described security policy.
What does this indicate for the experiment’s hypothesis, that security policies
can be explained in relatively simple English and explicitly traced to lower-level
implementations? It appears that simple English, logically and explicitly described,
provides a sufficient system requirements specification when compared to traditional
requirements specification languages.

That is, a top-level narrative can be traced to

lower level abstractions to define appropriate system activities comparable to the
policy objectives one would see in a more formal specification language.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter places the experimental findings within the context of current
research, and presents thoughts for further study.
Implications
Reeder, et al (2007) states:
Security and privacy management tasks were previously left to expert
system administrators who could invest the time to learn and use complex
user interfaces, but now these tasks are increasingly left to end-users.
Two non-expert groups of policy authors are on the rise. First are nontechnical enterprise policy authors, typically lawyers or business
executives, who have the responsibility to write policies governing an
enterprise’s handling of personal information (Karat, J., Karat C.-M,
Brodie, C., & Feng, J, 2005). Second are end-users, such as those who
wish to set up their own spam filters, share files with friends but protect
them from unwanted access (Cao, X., & Iverson, L, 2006) (Good, N.S. &
Krekelberg, A., 2003) (Maxion, R.A. & Reeder, R.W., 2005), or share
shipping information with Web merchants while maintaining privacy
(Cranor, L.F., Guduru, P., Arjula, J., 2006).
As the use of information systems has spread throughout society, the need for less expert
policy interfaces has increased.

One can no longer assume that accomplished system

administrators are formulating policy and propagating its enforcement throughout the
user’s environment.

Today, a casual information technology user can maintain a

variety of devices such as smartphones, tablets, laptops, desktops, and file servers to
support ubiquitous connectivity.

Yet the security policy creation environments across

these devices are not consistent or user friendly.
continues to be the rule rather than exception.
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Rather, security by obscurity

There have been attempts to define structured policy authoring environments.
LeMay, Fatemieh, and Gunter (2007) state that “many of the challenges that arise
during the development and maintenance of an access control policy are caused by
the inability of the policy administrator to correctly translate high-level business
requirements into low-level access control policies that can be implemented in an
Access Decision Function (ADF)(p. 205).”

There has also been research on the

subject of making policy authoring domain friendly, in that different user
environments use different terminology, with a hierarchy of direction implicit in the
terms (Johnson, Karat, Karat, Grueneberg). For example, in the medical profession,
directions written by a doctor take precedence over those written by a nurse. While
these attempts to define and refine policy are useful, they apply a very different
approach: one of bottoms-up policy refinement. That is, security policy is defined
within the context of the devices and/or applications being used to enforce it.
not authored as a top-down function of an information system.

It is

While it is useful to

understand how policy is implemented within a complex system, it is not necessarily
the best approach to policy when dealing with non-expert system users.
Our research has taken a top down approach to security policy, treating
security policy as a top-level system requirement that must be allocated throughout
the design process.

With a complex system architecture, this is the preferred

approach to system design, in that functionality is allocated to specific components,
and, as technology evolves, replacement elements duplicate or improve upon the
functionality allocated to a specific element.
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Research to date on policy authoring has addressed hands-on observation of
20-30 subjects and focused on how the subjects performed the task, what errors they
commonly made, and how to correct those errors (Johnson, et al, 2010), (Reeder, et.
al, 2007).

The policy authoring tools developed used constrained language subsets

or templates manifested as pull-down menus.
Instead of making the user adapt to a new syntax and subset of language, we
have chosen to explore the use of traditional English language and the constructs of
storytelling and narrative decomposition as an alternative.

In our study, we have

synthesized the ongoing research in neuroscience, computer assisted storytelling, and
narrative understanding to present a top down approach to security policy.

Further,

through the application of an adapted grounded theory methodology, we were able to
do so with a somewhat larger sample of participants than previous studies have
accommodated.
While our sample size was larger, we also had to revise the study protocol to
adapt to the data delivery method.

To accommodate an on-line survey instrument,

one must adapt to the user interface conventions of web-based access methods:
namely, that users do not read long narratives online.

This modification to the

original experiment design forced the data to be delivered in smaller “vignettes”,
addressing single topic areas in each question set as opposed to the complex system
requirements.
Recommendations
There are several areas for research refinement that could be addressed in
future research.

120

User population description
One area we would have liked to address is the potential difference in policy
specification from the casual system user’s perspective.

The subject pool for the

experiment was a pool of experienced security practitioners: not a pool of general
computer users.

This was a question of available and cooperative subjects to

perform the experiment.

The author had access to security practitioners who had

practical work experience, and did not have access to a general population of casual
computer users.

In one respect, this simplified the study, in that the user population

understood the fundamental concepts of security policy.

On the other hand, this

complicated the study, because definitional questions were added to ensure all
practitioners had a relatively common understanding of the terms used in the
specifications.
to qualify.

A general population of “casual” computer users would be difficult

With the proliferation of tablet computers, notebooks, “smart phones”

and gaming devices, a common set of definitions and/or experiences might make the
demographics and categorization of such a group problematic.
Further research must be conducted to determine if this type of experiment is
feasible for the general class of system users with larger sample sizes. This may be
the only way to determine if simple security policies can be understood and
subsequently enforced upon larger user communities.

Locating a collection of

willing participants that do not reflect a bias because of their employer or student
status will make selection of such a student pool more difficult.

Such

experimentation may be better focused in the realm of product manufacturing. Cell
phones and tablet computers tailored to the elderly and the preschool markets have

121

begun to come to market.

It would not be far fetched for a more simplistic user

interface to abstract the operating system’s complexities from the end user:

witness

the popularity of windows-oriented interfaces over character-based interfaces.
Description of general user situations
The study addressed three distinct system architectures: enterprise e-mail,
network infrastructure, and a publish-subscribe cross-domain solution. These types
of architectures are representative of the types of general complex system problems
that exist in current information technology environments.

However, with the

exception of e-mail, they are not the types of systems that end users encounter every
day. Most of the activity in complex system architectures is transparent to the enduser. That is, the systems deliver information to the end user subject to the user’s
operational constraints and the system’s policy enforcement capabilities.
The end user does not see the system components of web-based electronic
purchase transactions such as inventory management, order fulfillment, and payment
processing.

The results of those functions are delivered to the end user, but are not

presented in detail.

For example, the user may see a message that a credit card was

rejected. The details of the rejection process and its workflow are not presented to
the end user; only a message to contact the issuing organization is displayed.
A series of usage scenarios needs to be created to determine the applicability
of this methodology to the casual system user. In these cases, the security policy and
its enforcement is transparent to the system user, who is not provided sufficient
information to determine why his request was not fulfilled. While this is deliberate
to avoid sharing information that could be used to compromise the system, it does
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distance the user from understanding the role of security policy enforcement. If the
user does not understand that a policy exists the user could not be expected to
understand its enforcement.
Application of Ontological Based Deconstruction
As the technologies for natural language have matured, the ontologies that
support natural language processing have become more robust.

One of the

constraining functions of computer-assisted storytelling has been the ability of the
computer to understand the user’s contextual information. For example, the number
“42” in most contexts is just a random number; to those who have read “The
Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy” the number 42 is the meaning of life, the universe,
and everything.
With the emergence of large storage area networks, it is possible for
computers to rapidly search large quantities of data and determine the probability a
given fact fits a given user context.

For example, when IBM’s Watson architecture

played Jeopardy!, Watson did extremely well on questions that required rapid factbased searches.

It was less successful on questions that required some degree of

background or contextual information.

This is consistent with security policy

enforcement as well: binary answers are easy; answers that depend on a collection of
circumstances are more difficult to determine.
Raskin et al (2001) developed a preliminary ontology of information security
terms. While this ontology presented a synthesis of cryptographic terms and
information security terms, it predates a large body of technology and terminology
that has become commonplace. For example, tablet computing, notebooks, and cloud
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computing did not exist at the time the Raskin ontology was created. As such, the
development of security-specific ontologies must also address the current and
emerging technology baseline.

Otherwise, security will continue to be an

afterthought in the system development process and lag behind in technology
innovation and acceptance.
A security specific ontology must address information sharing mechanisms
and unique user identification and authorization techniques.

Without the language

constructs to address constrained information sharing, identity management, and
information provenance, there will be little functional enforcement of theoretical
policy constructs.

This will become an increasing problem as the “Internet of

Things” emerges and temporary social media become more prominent in our quest
for connectedness.
For example, a given hotel chain may offer a “lobby network” for registered
guests to help them find dinner partners in a strange town.

Participation in such a

network may be voluntary, but would only be available to paying guests.
Specification of the constraints associated with such social information sharing would
need to address both membership in the group of registered guests and the location of
the hotel.

When a guest checks out, the hotel must remove his access to the group,

or remove him from the location after his anticipated stay is over. Such constraints
can be gleaned from the user check-in experience, but only if the capability is
integrated into the guest registration and billing infrastructure.
As another example, consider the electronic health record.

Today’s medical

technology allows home-based monitoring of various medical information types that
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are valuable to the treating physician.

This information can be stored and used to

create general trending data to adjust medication and treatment plans for patients.
The devices, the information stored, the patient, and the physician all have some
access rights to this information.

The question is how to limit those rights within the

constraints of patient privileged information and patient identity. As an example,
there are instances when reporting of infectious diseases such as influenza to public
health officials is in the interests of the common good, and such data is usually
reported without patient identification.

Again, definition of the information sharing

policy must be simple enough to be understood, but complex enough to address the
potential usage or value chain associated with the information.
The Transitivity of Security Policy Enforcement
One of the key features of a partially ordered set representation of security
policy is the transitive nature of security policy enforcement.

That is, the results are

the same if (a + b) + c or if a + (b + c). As we move towards risk adaptive access
controls, the chain of variables increases:

(a + b) + (c + d) + e. As the number of

variables increases, the results of policy decisions may result in inconsistencies based
on the order of enforcement or evaluation.

Risk Adaptive Access Control

mechanisms are just emerging from the research laboratories, and have not been
implemented in a commercial-off-the-shelf product architecture to date.

More

experimentation with both the policy representation and the order of evaluation must
be accomplished with multi-variant security policy logic.

These activities are

essential as we move towards autonomic systems, where the system is responsible for
security policy enforcement and takes action without human intervention.
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As the

Internet of Things (IoT) emerges, sensor networks will incorporate logic to take
actions when specific threshold values are reached.

In these cases, a system may

shut down, throttle back production, or decrease network bandwidth based upon the
programmed policies.

If the results of policy evaluation are not transitive, then the

failure conditions may not be consistent.

If this is the case, a system may be shut

down or removed from service based upon false information, or, worst case, lives
may be lost because the system believed everything was fine.

Experimentation is

necessary to determine both policy correctness and operational policy implementation
correctness.

There is considerable room for error between a logical policy model

and the software that embodies that policy model in an operational system.
Evolution of Storytelling Technologies
In “Do Story Agents Use Rocking Chairs”, Brooks (1996) hypothesized a
computer-generated storytelling architecture and stated that it was going to take a
considerable amount of effort to make such a system a reality.

The question of

automated storytelling has been deconstructed into a series of questions about
contextual information: what a given phrase means within a given context and how
the language is arranged within a sentence. With the advent of Attribute Based
Access Control (ABAC) models, we have the capability to describe the access control
related context of a given object in a standardized context.

What remains to be

accomplished is the integration of security context with storytelling capabilities to
determine if the actions are consistent with the user’s intent. In the non-cyber world
it is relatively easy to determine if a user has violated access controls:
alarms go off, there are signs of forced entry, and items are missing.
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physical

In the cyber

world, data can be missing and the owner may not be aware that it has been taken, or
worse, altered in some way that would lead to a wrong conclusion. The complexity
of system architectures and network infrastructures add to the complexity of security
policies in that there are that many more devices that have the opportunity to alter the
security policy or misinterpret it in transit. For example, an application layer firewall
may prohibit communication that should be permitted because a particular protocol is
not supported.

Considerably more research must be conducted in this area to

determine if a fully automated security policy generation environment can be created.
Summary
In conclusion, we have presented the case for policy elicitation through the
use of structured storytelling as a less intimidating, more descriptive technique that
would lend itself to contextual security information such as that required for risk
adaptive access control model. We believe this would be a more comprehensible
system security policy definition; one that could elicit the information required for
various security policy models and supports a degree of formalism that would be
amenable to formal methods and logical proof if desired.
Our review of the literature surveyed a large and diverse set of security
policies that have formal model as well as several policy authoring tools that explore
templates, constrained natural languages, and graphical authoring environments.
Further, we presented a collection of analytical tools to disassemble narrative text and
story elements into their basic components for textual analysis.

The policies

discussed are highly formal, the policy authoring environments constrain the users
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ability to select in syntax and expression, and the narrative analysis tools have not
been applied to security policies.
The experimental discussion presented an overview of the issues associated
with security policy specification and logical correspondence. Security policies have
become more expressive with additional constraints and rule-based capabilities,
which have made reaching the eventual binary access control decision a more
complex task.

Additionally, the need to provide dynamic security policies in the

event of cyber attack scenarios means policy modifications must be rapidly
propagated throughout an infrastructure. This does not leave time to resolve security
policy conflicts when an entire mission critical network may be compromised.
As an alternative approach, we offer the specification of security policy
through storytelling. Stories provoke discussion, help our collective memory recall
the success or failure of past policy attempts, and encourage alternative solutions. As
security policies become more robust in their emulation of the “real world, “ it will
become more difficult to prove logical soundness with existing formal methods.
Given that the ability to perform natural language processing is improving, it may be
more feasible to perform policy analysis through the use of narratology. The use of
computer-assisted narrative for policy management is an area that has not been
explored to date.
Further research in ontologies and natural language authoring environments
needs to be conducted to determine if policies can be expressed and analyzed with
these capabilities.

Mankind shares a common social history in story; our cultural

differences change the context.

As our social media converges in the global
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communications network, it will be interesting to determine if our stories and our
policies converge as well.
Our experiment adapted the qualitative grounded theory methodology to the
specification of security policies.

We demonstrated correspondence to Glaser and

Strauss’ criteria for a grounded theory experiment (1968). The experiment is not a
strict interpretation of grounded theory methodology, which, in the constructs of
Bloomberg and Volpe (2012), involves small populations, repeated interviews, and
shared experiences among the population.

Using this strict interpretation of

qualitative experiment design would have minimized the population size, and
sacrificed anonymity of the user population.

It also would have proven manpower

intensive to perform one-on-one interviews with 150 experimental subjects.
The initial experimental objective, that narrative could be applied more
effectively as a requirements language than traditional specification language was
successfully illustrated. As the system architectures became more complex the
narrative specifications appeared to deliver a more precise model of system behavior,
as defined in the narrative specification and derived from the question responses.
The use of an anonymous survey as a measuring instrument may lack a preferred
depth of data in that subjects are not interviewed; the survey does provide sufficient
contextual information about the system to infer correct user behaviors from the
described security policy. While system requirements specification language also
describes system behavior, in our results the requirements specification respondents
wanted additional detail to remove ambiguity from the requirements.
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What does this indicate for the experiment’s hypothesis, that security policies
can be explained in relatively simple English and explicitly traced to lower-level
implementations? It appears that simple English, logically and explicitly described,
can provide a sufficient system requirements specification when compared to
traditional requirements specification languages.

That is, a top-level narrative can

be traced to lower level abstractions defining appropriate system activities
comparable to the policy objectives one would see in a more formal specification
language.
In the early stages of this dissertation, the vision was the adaptation of a
natural language storytelling environment to the creation of security policy. As the
research survey continued, it was apparent that machine-assisted storytelling was in
its infancy.

There are writer’s aids that assist in defining plot and story characters,

but none that can comprehensively address the dimensions of a security specification.
Using storytelling to address the nineteen requirements families covered in NIST’s
Security Controls Catalog would require authoring a large book.

It may be more

effective to model security policy in a game based simulation, where information
context can be visualized.
In today’s computer system environment, security policy can be enforced at
any point from the user’s device back to the storage area network.

Each device has

its own syntax, it’s own commands, and it’s own enforcement mechanisms.

The

integrated totality of the protection mechanisms is the responsibility of the system
architect, who is ultimately responsible for allocating portions of the policy to the
various devices.

The security architect is responsible for translation of the security
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policy at the policy definition point interface to the system.

Until the policy

definition point can be simplified, the users of computer systems will depend upon
the security decisions of the system architects to provide the protections required for
system security and integrity.
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Appendix A

Preliminary Glossary of Information Security Terminology
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The following terms were proposed in (Raskin, Hempelmann, Triezenberg, and
Nirenburg, 2001) as a preliminary attempt to reconcile the terminology of the security
community with the ontologies under development at that time.

To the author’s

knowledge, the list has not been updated or published since the original paper.
Absolute rate

AS-400

Boot sector virus

Access control

Associativity

Bootstrap virus

Access control list

Assurance

Bounds register

Access control matrix

Assymetric encryption

Break

Access log

Attack

Brute force attack

Access triple

Attribute

Buffer

Accountability

Audit

Buffer overflow

Accuracy

Audit log

Caesar cipher

Address

Audit operations

Call bracket

Adjudicable

Audit options

Capability

Aggregate query

Authenticate

Career criminal

Aggressive scheduler

Authentication

Category

Algorithm

Authenticity

CERT

Amateur

Automatic retaliation

Analog

Availability

Certificate
Certificate
center

Analyzability

Backdoor

Certificate revocation list

Anklebiter

Backup

Certification authority

Anonymity

Base register

Certified code

Applet

Bastion host

Certified mail

Arbiter

Block cipher

CGI script
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distribution

Change log

Confidentiality

Cryptography

Channel

Configuration management

Cryptology

Checksum

Confusion

Cryptosystem

Chinese wall policy

Connectivity

Cycle

Chinese Wall Model

Conservative scheduler

Data

Cipher

Constrained data item

Data encryption standaard

Cipher block chain

Contract signing

Ciphertext

Control

Database
Database management system

Classification

Controlled sharing

Datagram

Clearance

Cookie

Decideability

Client

Copy

Decipher

Clique problem

Copyright

Decode

Code

CORBA

Decrypt

Collision

Core

Degausser

Columnar transposition

Core dump

Dependability

Commit

Correct

Diagram

Commitment

Coupling

Diffusion

Common Criteria

Cover story

Digest

Commutativity

Covert

Digital

Compartment

Covert channel

Digital signature

Complexity

Covert timing channel

Digital signature scheme

Composite

Cracker

Directory

Compression

Credentials

Disaster

Computing system

Criteria creep

Disclosure

Conceal

Cryptanalysis

Distributivity

Concurrency-control

Cryptanalyst

Divisible by

134

Domain

Exposure

Index of coincidence

Dominance

Fabrication

Inductance

Dongle

Fair use

Inference

Double transposition

Fairness

Information

Driver

Fence register

Information hiding

Effectively secure

Field

Information leak

Effectiveness

Field check

Integrity

Egoism

File protection

Intercept

Egoless programming

Filter

Internal consistency

Electronic code book mode

Fire

Interpretation drift

Element

Firewall

Interruption

Encapsulation

Flood

Intruder

Encipher

Flooding

Inverse divide

Encode

Frequency distribution

Inverse mod

Encrypt

Front end

Isolation

Equivalent

Guard

Join

Error code

Guest

Kasiski method

Error propagation

Hack

Kernel

Ethic

Hardware

Key

Etiquette

Hash

Key distribution server

Evaluation

Heat

Keyless cipher

Evidence

Hierarchy

Knapsack

Executive

Host

Lattice model

Exhaustive attack

Identity

Layering

Expandability

Impersonate

Least privilege
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License

Multiplex

Peer code review

Limited privilege

Mutual suspicion

Peer design review

Link

Need-to-know

Permission

Local name space

Network

Logic

Node

Permutation
PGP (Pretty Good
Privacy)

Logic analyzer

Nondeterminism

Physical

Logic bomb

Notarization

Plaintext

Lucifer

Notary

Policy

Macro

Novelty

Polyalphabetic cipher

Macro virus

Nucleus

Polymorphic (virus)

Maintain

Object

Polynomial

Malicious code

Object request broker

Port

Master key

Oblivious transfer

Precise

Measure of roughness

One-time

Prime number

Mechanism

Open design

Privacy

Memory-resident virus

Optical fiber

Probably password

Mental poker

Oracle machine

Problem

Message digest

Originality

Product cipher

Microwave

Packet

Program

Modern

Packet sniffer

Project

Modification

Paging

Property

Modular arithmetic

Parasitic virus

Protect

Module

Parity

Protected object

Modulus

Password

Protocol

Monitor

Patent

Query

Monoalphabetic cipher

Payload

Rabbit

136

Random access memory

Secrecy

Solvable problem

Read only memory

Secure

Spoof

Receiver

Security audit

Stream cipher

Record

Segment

Stub

Recover

Segmentation

Subject

Reducibility

Self-enforcing protocol

Subscheme

Redundancy

Semantic sugar

Substitutions

Relation

Sender

Suppress

Relative prime

Sensitive

Surge

Reliable

Sensitive data

Symmetric

Religion

Separation

Symmetric key exchange

Relocation

Server

Tamper

Repeater

Service program

Tamperproofness

Replay

Session

Target

Resident virus

Session key

Temporal

Resource

Shadow program copy

Terminal

Reuse

Shared file

Test

Reverse engineer

Shared resource matrix

Theft

Ring bracket

Shell theft

Time bomb

Risk

Shredder

Time stamp

Rogue program

Shrink wrapped software

Topology

Routing

Side effect

Trade secret

Salami attack

Simple substitution

Traffic key

Satellite

Single-user system

Transformation procedure

Satisfiability problem

Socket

Transient virus

Schema

Software

Transmission medium

137

Transposition

Vernam cipher

Trapdoor

View

Trigram

Vigenere tableau

Tripwire

Virtual

Trojan horse

Virtualization

Trusted

Virus

Unbypassability

Virus scanner

Unconditionally secure

Virus signature

Understand

Vulnerability

Unicity distance

Window

Unix

Wiretap

Usage restriction

Workstation

User

Worm

Validation

Write-down

Verification
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Figure K-1a. Demographic Information, Question 2, Architecture 1.
Total Sample Size = 50 subjects.

25 for Requirements Format, 25 for

Narrative Format.
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Figure K-1b. Demographic Information, Question 2, Architecture 2.
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Total Sample Size = 50 subjects.

25 for Requirements Format, 25 for

Narrative Format.
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Figure K-1c. Demographic Information, Question 2, Architecture 3
Total Sample Size = 50 subjects.
Narrative Format.
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Figure K-2a. Demographic Information, Question3, Architecture 1
Total Sample Size = 50 subjects.

25 for Requirements Format, 25 for

Narrative Format.
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Figure K-2b. Demographic Information, Question3, Architecture 2
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